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Politically strident debates surrounding end-of-life
decisionmaking have surfaced once again, this time across the Atlantic
in Italy. Eluana Englaro died in 2009 after a prolonged court fight,
causing the international press to compare her case to that of Theresa
Marie Schiavo, who passed away in 2005 in Florida after nearly
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sparking constitutional crises on both state and federal levels. In many
respects, the facts of Ms. Englaro's case are similar to those of Schiavo,
but a close analysis of Englaro leads to the surprising conclusion that
the Italian Court of Cassazione in that case actually enunciated a
broader, stronger right to make end-of-life decisions than has the
United States Supreme Court thus far in America.
The parallels between Englaro and Schiavo in the legislature are
also instructive. In a number of ways, despite the breadth of the
Cassazione's judicial decision in Englaro, institutional differences seem
to be leading Italy down a different path in the Parliament than the
United States has taken through the federal or its several state
legislatures. Despite the introduction of advance directive legislation in
Parliament, it seems that Italy's path toward patients' preserving
robust end-of-life decisionmaking power even in incompetency lies not
through that body's actions in the future but through that body's past
actions. If the current proposed legislation fails, it is possible that
patients and the courts can build upon the groundwork the courts have
established through the statutory tool of the amministratore di sostegno
to secure robust patient autonomy near the end of life.
The debates surrounding end-of-life decisionmaking have
surfaced once again, this time across the Atlantic in Italy. The
international press covering Eluana Englaro's' (Ms. Englaro's)
end-of-life decisionmaking litigation compared Ms. Englaro's
case to that of Theresa Marie Schiavo2 (Ms. Schiavo). In many
respects, the facts of Ms. Englaro's case (Englaro) are similar to
Ms. Schiavo's.3 Both women were in the prime of their lives 4
1. Eluana Englaro died on Monday, February 9, 2009, after a prolonged court
fight initiated by her father, Beppino Englaro, to honor her wish to die in a
dignified way. See Richard Owen, Coma Woman Dies According to Her Wish Before
Parliament Can Resume Feeding, THE TIMES (LONDON), Feb. 10, 2009, at 32.
2. See Id. See also Paddy Agnew, Eluana's 17-Year Sleep Caught up in Legal Row
Over Treatment, THE IRISH TIMES, Jan. 28, 2009, at 13; Peter Popham, Church Fury as
Coma Woman Allowed to Die; Italian Court Grants Father Right to End Daughter's Life,
THE INDEPENDENT (LONDON), Nov. 14, 2008, at 32; Ariel David, Italians Debate Case
Like Schiavo's, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Aug. 2, 2008, at A.7; John Hooper, Ruling on
Coma Victim Brings Euthanasia Issue to Fore in Italy, THE IRISH TIMES, July 11, 2008, at
11.
3. See Donald Carroll & Christine Marciasini, Advance Care Directives: Florida,
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when they fell into a persistent or permanent vegetative state
(PVS);5 both women lacked living wills expressing their desires
as to what type of care they wished to receive in the event that
they were no longer able to make decisions due to illness or
incapacity; and neither had appointed a healthcare proxy.
Indeed, Ms. Englaro could not have had a living will or
appointed a health care proxy because Italy had no legislation
specifically authorizing anticipatory end-of-life decisionmaking. 6
While the factual circumstances of Ms. Englaro and Ms.
Schiavo were similar, the end-of-life decisionmaking laws facing
the two women were not. By the time Ms. Schiavo fell into a
PVS, there existed a well-established body of laws concerning
end-of-life decisionmaking. Florida, the jurisdiction whose laws
applied in Ms. Schiavo's case, had codified such laws,/
specifically permitting the withholding or withdrawal of "life-
prolonging procedures" from a person in a PVS without an
advance directive under certain conditions.8 In contrast, the
litigation that Ms. Englaro's father (Mr. Englaro) brought on her
behalf to discontinue life-prolonging procedures was fraught
Italy and the Holy Grail of Wishes, 2 (on file with the authors) (noting that Ms. Englaro
"is known in Italy as the 'Italian Terri Schiavo"'). Compare Kathy L. Cerminara,
Theresa Marie Schiavo's Long Road to Peace, 30 DEATH STUDIES 101 (2006). [hereinafter
Cerminara, Long Road to Peace] (detailing Ms. Schiavo's story) with Michael Day &
Tracy McVeigh, National: Special Report: A Father's Plea, THE OBSERVER (England),
Feb. 8, 2009, at 8 (interview with Ms. Englaro's father about her story).
4. Ms. Englaro was 20 years old while Ms. Schiavo was 27 years old.
5. Coincidentally, both women fell into PVS only two years apart from each
other. See David, supra note 2 ("Englaro was 20 years old when she fell into a
vegetative state after a car accident in 1992."). See Cerminara, Long Road to Peace,
supra note 3, at 102. For an interactive timeline of the Terri Schiavo's case, see Kathy
L. Cerminara & Kenneth W. Goodman, Key Events in the Case of Theresa Marie
Schiavo, UNIV. OF MIAMI-ETHICS PROGRAMS, http://www.miami.edu/ethics/schiavo
/terrischiavo timeline.html (last updated Dec. 27, 2008) [hereinafter Cerminara,
Key Events].
6. The Italian Parliament had previously considered such legislative
proposals, and it has continued to do so during and since the courts ruled in
Englaro. See infra p 320-28. There already existed under Italian law a legislative
framework that could apply by extension to health care decisions, through the Act
on "amministrazione di sostegno," see infra p. 328-60, but nothing specific existed.
7. FLA. STAT. § 765.101-546 (1997).
8. § 765.404 (allowing the withdrawal of life-prolonging procedures for a
patient in PVS if the patient had no advance directive).
MARQUETTE ELDER'S ADVISOR
with legal obstacles because of the uncertainty in Italian end-of-
life decisionmaking law in dealing with Ms. Englaro's situation.
This Article will compare and analyze the legal
development of Italian end-of-life decisionmaking law with that
in the United States through Ms. Englaro's and Ms. Schiavo's
court cases. Section I will trace the development of end-of-life
decisionmaking law in the U.S. up to the Schiavo litigation.
Section II will outline and comment on Ms. Schiavo's litigation
process while Section III will similarly describe Ms. Englaro's
litigation process and outcome. Section IV will compare Italian
end-of-life decisionmaking law to U.S. end-of-life
decisionmaking law, emphasizing the significance of Ms.
Englaro's case. Finally, Section V will demonstrate how the path
pursuant to which Italian end-of-life decisionmaking law is
developing far more closely resembles the development of U.S.
end-of-life decisionmaking law than one might predict given the
countries' differing cultural backgrounds and political and
judicial systems. Despite the similarities in path, substantial
differences exist, in some rather surprising areas.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF UNITED STATES END-OF-LIFE
DECISIONMAKING LAW
Fundamentally, end-of-life decisionmaking is the right or ability
to refuse life-sustaining or life-prolonging treatments when
patients no longer wish to receive such treatments. Scholars and
end-of-life decisionmaking advocates' have argued that this
right encompasses the right to assistance in dying and even to
euthanasia for patients suffering from terminal illness. But
whereas the courts and various legislatures have recognized the
9. See, e.g., Norman L. Cantor, Two Opinions in Search of a Justice: The
Constitution and Physician-Assisted Suicide, 28 RUTGERS L.J. 435 (1997); Sylvia A. Law,
Physician-Assisted Death: An Essay on Constitutional Rights and Remedies, 55 MD. L.
REV. 292 (1996); David Orentlicher, The Alleged Distinction Between Euthanasia and the
Withdrawal of Life-Sustaining Treatment: Conceptually Incoherent and Impossible to
Maintain, U. ILL. L. REV. 837 (1998). But see, e.g., Yale Kamisar, The "Right to Die": On
Drawing (and Erasing) Lines, 35 DUQ. L. REV. 481 (1996).
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right to refuse life-prolonging treatment,"o and even assistance in
dying," the courts have affirmatively held that no person has the
constitutional right to euthanasia. 12 Indeed, the blurring and
confusion of this distinction in the continuum between the right
to refuse life-prolonging treatment and euthanasia make end-of-
life decision discussions contentious. This is especially true
when a private medical decision of an individual takes on a
public dimension, as it does when the decision is litigated in
court to resolve conflicts. At least one of the major conflicts
inherent in end-of-life decisionmaking arises because of a clash
of competing choices between preserving life 3 (perhaps at all
costs, including discarding the wishes of the individual) 4 and
personal autonomy." At the intersection between these two
10. See ALAN MEISEL & KATHY L. CERMINARA, THE RIGHT TO DIE: THE LAW OF
END-OF-LIFE DECISIONMAKING §2.02 (3d. ed. 2004 & Supp. 2005-2009). [hereinafter
THE RIGHT TO DIE].
11. E.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 127.800-.897 (1999); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§70.245.010 -.904 (West 2009); Baxter v. State, No. ADV-2007-787 at 17 (Mont. 1st
Dist. Ct. Dec. 5, 2008) available at http://www.aclumontana.org/images/stories/
documents/081208-district-court-opinion-baxter.pdf.
12. Euthanasia generally refers to "the 'active' ending of the life of another in
order to end that patient's suffering." THE RIGHT TO DIE, supra note 10, at §12.01[A].
This is distinct from assistance in dying and withholding/withdrawing treatment,
which courts have affirmatively held do not constitute suicide. See id. at §12.02[B].
13. Laws whose aim is preserving sanctity of life include statutory enactments
criminalizing euthanasia and court cases upholding those laws against
constitutional attack. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 728 (1997)
(holding that the U.S. Constitution does not confer the right to assisted death);
Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 280-81, n.8 (1990)(discussing the
important state interest in preserving life); For an excellent discussion regarding
the long standing tradition of aversion to suicide, see generally George P. Smith II,
All's Well That Ends Well: Toward a Policy of Assisted Rational Suicide or Merely
Enlightened Self-Determination?, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 275 (1989). Other state
interests that are balanced against an individual's right to personal autonomy in
end-of-life decisionmaking are the state's interests in protection of third parties, and
maintenance of the ethics of the medical profession. See Superintendent of
Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 424-27 (Mass. 1977). See also
THE RIGHT TO DIE, supra note 10, at §5.04[B].
14. See THE PEW RESEARCH CTR. FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS, MORE
AMERICANS DISCUSSING - AND PLANNING - END-OF-LIFE TREATMENT: STRONG
PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR RIGHT TO DIE 1 (2006) available at http://people-
press.org/reports/pdf/266.pdf (a significant minority (22%) of the people surveyed
believed doctors and nurses should always do everything possible to save a
patient).
15. The doctrine of informed consent is at least one basis upon which personal
autonomy in the realm of medical decisionmaking is grounded. See Cruzan, 497
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choices lies the law of end-of-life decisionmaking, which has
developed in the U.S. to resolve some, but not all, of the
conflicts.
Conflict still persists because the tension between
preservation of life and personal autonomy is not easily
resolvable. Although laws appear clear on the surface, they are
difficult to implement because of culture clashes and political
positioning.16 The entire field of end-of-life decisionmaking law
arose because preservation of life became increasingly possible
through rapidly evolving medical science and technology, 17 and
"today's issues about forgoing life support are almost always
more complex and subtle than those of the 1970s [when the legal
U.S. at 269-275. See also THE RIGHT TO DIE, supra note 10, at §2.06[A]; Alan Meisel,
Physician-Assisted Suicide: Rights and Risks to Vulnerable Communities: Physician-
Assisted Suicide: A Common Law Roadmap for State Courts, 24 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 817,
845-46 (1997); LOIS SHEPHERD, IF THAT EVER HAPPENS TO ME: MAKING LIFE AND
DEATH DECISIONS AFTER TERRI SCHIAVO 60 (2009); Kenneth W. Goodman, Terry
Schaivo and the Culture Wars, in THE CASE OF TERRI SCHIAVO: ETHICS, POLITICS, AND
DEATH IN THE 21- CENTURY 1, 21 (Kenneth W. Goodman ed., 2009).
16. See, e.g., Robert M. Veatch, The Evolution of Death and Dying Controversies,
39 HASTINGS CTR. RPT. 16, 18 (2009) (noting that the issues raised in Schiavo "were
corrupted by political and religious disputes that delayed the apparently obvious
resolution of the conflict").
17. See Marilyn Webb, The Media and End-of-Life Choices and Decisions, in
DECISIONMAKING NEAR THE END OF LIFE: ISSUES, DEVELOPMENTS, AND FUTURE
DIRECTIONS 77, 80 (James L. Werth, Jr. & Dean Blevins eds., 2009)
[TJhe very diagnosis of PVS [Persistent Vegetative State] had only been
around in medical literature for 3 years [prior to 1975]. Indeed, it had not
yet been 10 years since technology had advanced far enough - through the
use of emergency cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) and life-
prolonging apparatuses - to allow a person to live long enough for PVS
even to exist. Prior to that, we either lived, or we died
Id.;
Veatch, supra note 16, at 18 (describing evolution of end-of-life decisionmaking
law). See also Kathy L. Cerminara, Three Female Faces: The Law of End-of-Life
Decisionmaking in America, in DECISIONMAKING NEAR THE END OF LIFE: ISSUES,
DEVELOPMENTS, AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 95, 96 (James L. Werth, Jr. & Dean Blevins
eds., 2009) [hereinafter Cerminara, Three Female Faces]
The technological imperative encouraged extensive use of advanced
machinery and chemical agents to prolong life much longer than
previously had been possible. As physicians and family attempted to deal
with the effects of such technological advances, 'humane decisions against
resuscitative or maintenance therapy were frequently a recognized de
facto response in the medical world to the irreversible, terminal pain-
ridden patient, especially with familial consent.'
Id. (citation omitted).
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principles first developed]."" As the medical sciences advance
to the level of keeping people alive in twilight-like stages of
existence, the laws regarding end-of-life decisionmaking have
tagged along behind scientific development. Indeed, "[i]t has
been said that '(t)he law always lags behind the most advanced
thinking in every area. It must wait until the theologians and the
moral leaders and events have created some common ground,
some consensus."' 19 Thus, the courts and legislatures in the U.S.
have been wrestling with end-of-life decisionmaking issues for
the past thirty years.
THE COMMON-LAWAND CONSTITUTIONAL BASES FOR END-OF-
LIFE DECISIONMAKING
U.S. end-of-life decisionmaking law developed from two
primary, independent legal sources. 20 The first source is the
doctrine of informed consent under tort law.2 1 At common law,
touching another person without that person's consent and
without legal justification is battery.22 Thus a doctor or other
medical caregiver performing any medical procedure that
requires touching the patient would require the patient's
informed consent, and failing to obtain informed consent would
amount to the doctor committing the tort of battery on the
patient.23 Informed consent has been expanded to broadly
encompass the idea that the patient must receive and
understand information about the medical condition, the
treatment, and the treatment's risks and benefits in order to
18. Veatch, supra note 16, at 18.
19. See Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d
417, 423. (Mass. 1977).
20. Cerminara, Three Female Faces, supra note 17, at 97 ("both constitutional and
common-law bases for the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment exist").
21. See THE RIGHT TO DIE, supra note 10, at § 2.06[A] (citing cases that discuss
informed consent).
22. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269 (1990).
23. Mohr v. Williams, 104 N.W. 12, 12, 16 (Minn. 1905); Hershley v. Brown, 655
S.W.2d 671, 676 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983). See also W. E. Shipley, Liability of Physician or
Surgeon for Extending Operation or Treatment Beyond That Expressly Authorized, 56
A.L.R.2d 695, §§l[b], 2 (1957).
3012011]1
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consent to any interference with his or her bodily integrity. 24
Accordingly, informed consent means that a patient capable of
making medical decisions must voluntarily consent to medical
treatment after he or she is provided with enough information to
make a knowledgeable decision. 25
Informed consent, however, is a relatively narrow and weak
basis for the right to refuse medical treatment for several
reasons. First, informed consent developed from tort law, which
seeks to resolve disputes between private parties with the major
goal of compensating the injured party as a result of civil
wrongs. The objective of tort law is not to secure fundamental
rights but rather to prevent civil wrongs from happening and to
compensate the injured party.26 Second, and more important, if
a legislature does not agree with a judicial determination
regarding the common law of informed consent, the legislature
may pass a law that limits future judicial determinations in
similar informed consent cases, thus changing the law.27 Third,
the doctrine of informed consent, at first glance, seems to
suggest that the right to refuse medical treatment does not apply
to an incompetent person because informed consent requires
that the patient be capable of making an informed decision. 28
Yet, the right to refuse treatment is often litigated precisely
because the patient suffers from a medical condition that renders
him or her incapable of doing so; by necessity, the doctrine of
informed consent has been extended to apply to persons who
are currently incapable of making medical decisions but who
have people making those decisions on their behalf.29 For these
24. Cerminara, Three Female Faces, supra note 17, at 97-98.
25. Cerminara, Three Female Faces, supra note 17, at 98.
26. See Jules Coleman, Theories of Tort Law, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY, (Edward N. Zalta ed., Fall 2008 ed.) available at
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/tort-theories (noting that in cases
of tort, courts direct people responsible for wrongful activity to either to pay
damages or stop the wrongful activity).
27. Cerminara, Three Female Faces, supra note 17, at 99.
28. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 417 (1988) (en banc).
29. E.g. Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d
417, 429 (Mass. 1977); Eichner v. Dillon, 420 N.E.2d 64, 70 (N.Y. 1981); In re Conroy,
486 A.2d 1209, 1229-33 (N.J. 1985); Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261,
302 [Vol. 12
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reasons, those seeking to assert a right to refuse medical
treatment will find a stronger basis in other legal sources (the
U.S. Constitution and the Constitutions of the various states)
than in the doctrine of informed consent.
Indeed, the first major reported case involving end-of-life
decisionmaking recognized that the right to refuse life-
sustaining treatment emanated from the constitutional right of
privacy of "personal decision.""o In re Quinlan,3' a New Jersey
Supreme Court case, established the right of an incompetent
person in a persistent vegetative state to refuse medical
treatment on the basis of both the federal and the New Jersey
Constitution.32 In that case, the father of Karen Ann Quinlan, a
woman in a PVS, sought a court order granting him the express
power to discontinue his daughter's ventilator support in spite
of the objections of various interested parties.33 The Quinlan
court declared that the state's interests in preserving life and
maintaining the ethics of the medical profession did not
outweigh the patient's right to refuse treatment because of the
degree of bodily invasion involved in ventilator support and the
very poor prognosis of the patient.34
In securing the right to refuse treatment to a constitutional
basis, the Quinlan court situated it in strong soil, more broadly
and more strongly protecting the right than if it had based the
267-76 (1990).
30. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 663 (N.J. 1976).
31. See generally id.
32. The Quinlan Court's holding that the U.S. Constitution protects the right to
refuse treatment is based upon Justice Douglas's 'penumbras' of rights theory, from
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). Subsequent Supreme Court cases
recognizing the right to privacy, however, emanate from Justice Harlan's
concurrence in Griswold. In contrast to Justice Douglas, Justice Harlan argued that
the right to privacy is protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution as applied to the States. Even apart from this
distinction, this portion of the Quinlan holding uses outdated terminology. See
Cruzan v. Dir., 497 U.S. at 278 (characterizing the constitutional right that it assumed
existed as a "liberty interest" rather than a privacy right).
33. Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 651. Mr. Quinlan sought appointment as his
daughter's guardian in addition to seeking express power to authorize
discontinuation of Karen Ann's ventilator support.
34. Id. at 663-64.
3032011]
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decision on the doctrine of informed consent. No state actors,
not even a legislature, can contravene rights protected under the
constitution except in a constitutionally appropriate manner.35
More important, constitutional rights supersede all other sorts of
law.36 The Quinlan Court's ruling thus was an auspicious
beginning for champions of a right to refuse life-sustaining
medical treatment,37 and many courts followed its decision to
find a constitutional basis for the right.38 The U.S. Supreme
Court, however, refused to rule broadly in Cruzan v. Director of
Missouri Department of Health,39 the only case it has decided on
issue of the withdrawal of treatment end-of-life decisionmaking
thus far.40
Cruzan resembled Quinlan in that the case involved the
parents of a young woman in a PVS seeking the courts'
35. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 176-77 (1803) (stating the Constitution
is the supreme law of the land and the legislature cannot enact laws that contravene
the Constitution). This principle also applies at the state level. See also Cerminara,
Three Female Faces, supra note 17, at 99. See Charles H. Baron, Life and Death
Decisionmaking: Judges v. Legislators as Sources of Law in Bioethics, 1 J. HEALTH AND
BIOMEDICAL L. 107 (2004).
36. See Baron, supra note 35, at 121 ("American Legislatures have the power to
overrule common law, but they do not have the power to override constitutional
rights.").
37. See Veatch, supra note 16, at 18 (describing the case as "mov[ing] to the
front and center the issues of family members' and other surrogates' involvement in
decisions to forgo treatment," and serving as a basis for what became a standard
approach to such issues).
38. See Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d
417, 424 (Mass. 1977); M.N. v. Southern Baptist Hosp. of Fla., Inc., 648 So.2d 769, 771
(Fla. Ct. App. 1994); In re Quackenbush, 383 A.2d 785, 789 (Morris County Ct. 1978);
Leach v. Akron Gen. Med. Ctr., 426 N.E.2d 809, 813-15 (C.P.P. Div. Summit County,
1980); In re Ingram, 689 P.2d 1363, 1369-70 (Wash. 1984); In re Saenz, 728 N.W.2d
765, 775 (Wis. Ct. App. 2007). However, a few courts have found the right to refuse
treatment in their states' constitutions. See Rasmussen v. Fleming, 741 P.2d 674, 682
(Ariz. 1987); In re Wendland, 28 P.3d 151, 158-59 (Cal. 2001); In re Browning, 568 So.
2d 4, 8 (Fla. 1990); In re Lawrance, 579 N.E.2d 32, 39 (Ind. 1991); Woods v. Kentucky
Cabinet for Human Resources, 142 S.W.3d 24, 32 (Ky. 2004); In re Colyer, 660 P.2d
738, 742 (Wash. 1983).
39. See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
40. In Cruzan, the Court acknowledged that
[w]e follow the judicious counsel of our decision in Twin City Bank v.
Nebeker, where we said that in deciding 'a question of such magnitude and
importance it is the [better] part of wisdom not to attempt, by any
general statement, to cover every possible phase of the subject.
Id. at 277-78 (citation omitted).
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authorization to withdraw life-prolonging treatment.4 1 The
parents of Nancy Cruzan asked the U.S. Supreme Court to
review the Missouri Supreme Court's decision denying their
request to withdraw Ms. Cruzan's medically supplied hydration
and nutrition. The Missouri Supreme Court had framed the
issue before it in the following manner: "May a guardian order
that food and water be withheld from an incompetent ward who
is in a persistent vegetative state but who is otherwise alive
within the meaning of [Missouri statute] and not terminally
ill?" 4 2 Answering this question in the negative, the Missouri
Supreme Court applied the Missouri living will statute and
interpreted the clear and convincing evidentiary standard set
forth in the statute as requiring that the evidence presented must
demonstrate the incompetent person's prior, actual, expressed
wishes. Such a high procedural and evidentiary standard
applied, according to that court, because Missouri's legislature
had expressed a desire to strongly favor the preservation of
life.4 3 The court denied Ms. Cruzan's parents' request to
withdraw life-prolonging treatment because they had not
provided proof that Ms. Cruzan previously had stated that she
wanted medically supplied nutrition and hydration withdrawn
if she ever entered a PVS.44
The Missouri court rested its decision on a number of
grounds. First, it reasoned that a patient could not authorize
withdrawal of treatment under the doctrine of informed consent
because it was impossible for a patient to act in an informed
manner to future hypothetical circumstances.45 It also declined
41. Ms. Cruzan's parents sought "a court order directing the withdrawal of
their daughter's artificial feeding and hydration equipment" rather than
withdrawal of ventilator support as in Quinlan. Id. at 265.
42. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 412 (1988) (en banc).
43. Id. at 419-20.
44. Id. at 424.
45. The court reasoned that it would be "definitionally impossible for a person
to make an informed decision - either to consent or to refuse - under hypothetical
circumstances" because the three factors required for informed consent were not
present. Id. at 417 (listing the following as requirements: a patient with "capacity
to reason and make judgments," a "decision . . made voluntarily and without
coercion," and a patient having "a clear understanding of the risks and benefits of
2011] 305
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to interpret the Missouri state constitution to include a broad
right of privacy that would confer the right to refuse treatment.46
Moreover, it was skeptical about the existence of a federal
constitutional right to privacy protecting a right to refuse
medical treatment. 47 Finally, it declared that "[b]road policy
questions bearing on life and death are more properly addressed
by representative assemblies," i.e. the legislature, than the
courts.48
It was against this backdrop that the United States Supreme
Court had to decide whether the Missouri court's strict
application of such a demanding standard of proof violated Ms.
Cruzan's liberty interest in refusing treatment under the U.S.
Constitution. In ruling that the Missouri court's decision did not
violate the U.S. Constitution, the United States Supreme Court
went on to state that "logic of the [constitutional cases
previously cited in the opinion] would embrace" a competent
person's liberty interest in refusing medical treatment, including
medically supplied nutrition and hydration, but it saw no need
to hold to that effect.49 Instead, the Court assumed that "the
United States Constitution would grant a competent person a
constitutionally protected right to refuse lifesaving hydration
and nutrition." 0 The Court also avoided the issue of whether an
incompetent person has the same right to refuse treatment.51
Instead, the Court narrowly decided that Missouri's requirement
"that evidence of the incompetent's wishes as to the withdrawal
of treatment be proved by clear and convincing evidence" did
not violate the federal Constitution. 52
the proposed treatment alternatives or nontreatment, along with a full
understanding of the nature of the disease and the prognosis"). Id.
46. Id. at 417-18.
47. Id. at 418.
48. Id. at 426.
49. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990).
50. Id. Later, the Court indicated that this ruling "strongly suggested" that a
constitutional right exists. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997);
Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 807 (1997); see generally THE RIGHT TO DIE, supra note
10, at § 2.03[A] [1] ,[2.
51. Cruzan v. Dir., 497 U.S. at 280.
52. See id.
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MEDICALLY SUPPLIED NUTRITION AND HYDRATION
In addition to avoiding the issue of whether an incompetent
person has a constitutional right to refuse treatment, Cruzan's
majority opinion did not expressly decide whether medically
supplied nutrition and hydration constitute medical treatment a
patient can refuse. It did, however, imply as much by stating
that "for purposes of this case, we assume that the United States
Constitution would grant a competent person a constitutionally
protected right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition." 3
Moreover, five of the justices (O'Connor, Brennan, Marshall,
Blackmun, and Stevens), in their respective concurrences and
dissents, agreed that medically supplied nutrition and hydration
constitutes medical treatment that patients may refuse like any
other treatment. In her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor
stated that "[a]rtificial feeding cannot readily be distinguished
from other forms of medical treatment." 54 Thus, she concluded
that "the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause must
protect ... an individual's deeply personal decision to reject
medical treatment, including the artificial delivery of food and
water."5 Likewise, Justice Brennan's dissent (joined by Justices
Marshall and Blackmun) emphatically declared that "[n]o
material distinction can be drawn between . .. artificial nutrition
and hydration ... and any other medical treatment." 56 Justice
Stevens's dissent implicitly agreed with this conclusion as well,
when he declared that Ms. Cruzan's best interest would be
served "by allowing her guardians to exercise her constitutional
right to discontinue medical treatment" with full knowledge that
the treatment in question was medically supplied nutrition and
hydration.57
In contrast, the majority opinion of the Missouri Supreme
Court had viewed medically supplied hydration and nutrition
53. Id. at 279.
54. Id. at 288.
55. Id. at 289.
56. Id. at 307.
57. Id. at 331.
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differently. Rather than accepting the medical convention 8 as a
legal fact, the majority opinion of the Missouri Supreme Court
questioned the medical convention, even boldly asserting that
"common sense tells us that food and water do not treat an
illness, they maintain life."5 9 This portion of the opinion is
essentially unsupported, for, although the court declared that
"[t]here is substantial disagreement ... among physicians and
ethicists [that medically supplied hydration and nutrition are
medical treatments]," the footnote supporting that declaration
points to the very medical conclusion with which the Court
disagreed, an opinion of the Council on Ethical and Judicial
Affairs of the American Medical Association stating that
medically supplied hydration and nutrition are medical
treatment. 60 Unlike the Missouri court in Cruzan, the majority of
other courts have held that medically supplied nutrition and
hydration are medical treatments that patients can refuse, even
when incompetent.6 1 Yet this issue remains a point of contention;
it would re-surface approximately 15 years later, when disability
rights and pro-life groups in Florida argued that medically
supplied hydration and nutrition constituted everyday care that
patients could not refuse.
THE SCHIAVO LITIGATION AND THE POLITICS OF END-OF-LIFE
DECISIONMAKING LAW IN THE U.S.
In February of 1990, Theresa Marie Schiavo suffered a cardiac
arrest that left her in a persistent, or permanent, vegetative state
58. The Council of Ethical and Judicial Affairs of the AMA (the CEJA)
considers medically supplied nutrition and hydration to be medical treatment that a
patient may refuse. See AM. MED. ASS'N COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL
AFFAIRS, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS: CURRENT OPINIONS WITH ANNOTATIONS 2.20
at 65 (2002-2003 ed.); Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 423 n.18 (1988) (en banc)
(citing then-current CEJA opinion to the same effect). See also THE RIGHT TO DIE,
supra note 10, at § 6.03[G][4].
59. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d at 423. In making this statement, the court
seemed to adopt the views stated in the briefs of the Missouri Citizens for Life, the
Association for Retarded Citizens of the United States and the Ethics and Advocacy
Task Force of the Nursing Home Action Group. Id. at 423 n.19.
60. Id. at 423 n.18.
61. See THE RIGHT TO DIE, supra note 10, at § 6.03[G].
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(PVS).62 Unlike Quinlan, Cruzan, and Englaro, Schiavo raised no
unsettled issues. To the contrary, the case presented well-settled
issues under Florida laws that permitted (and still permit)
withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment when a
patient is in a PVS.63 Also distinct from Quinlan, Cruzan and
Englaro, in which the State, in some form, protested the
withdrawal of treatment,64 Schiavo involved a dispute solely
between private parties, one of whom sought out the courts for
resolution. In that litigation, Ms. Schiavo's husband, Michael
Schiavo, and her parents, Robert and Mary Schindler, sharply
disagreed over whether to authorize withdrawal of medically
supplied nutrition and hydration after Ms. Schiavo had been in a
PVS for eight years.
Although the Schiavo litigation was not the first case in
which family members went to court concerning the refusal or
withdrawal of life-sustaining care,65 the litigation proved to be
quite public and controversial. 66 It lasted for more than seven
years, with its final months memorialized in multiple media
62. While legal sources use the terminology "persistent vegetative state,"
neurologists suggest that it is most appropriate to recognize that, after some time, a
persistent vegetative state transforms into a permanent vegetative state, from which
a patient is extremely unlikely to regain consciousness. See Kathy L. Cerminara,
Musings on the Need to Convince Some People With Disabilities That End-Of-Life
Decisionmaking Advocates Are Not Out to Get Them, 37 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 343, 352 (2006)
[hereinafter Cerminara, Musings].
63. FLA. STAT. § 765.302(1) (2009) ("Any competent adult may, at any time,
make a living will or written declaration and direct the providing, withholding, or
withdrawal of life-prolonging procedures in the event that such person . . . is in a
persistent vegetative state.").
64. Of additional special interest in terms of a state's protesting withdrawal of
treatment are the Sylvia Pouliot case and the gubernatorial intervention in the
Hugh Finn case. See Alicia R. Ouellette, When Vitalism is Dead Wrong: The
Discrimination Against and Torture of Incompetent Patients by Compulsory Life-
Sustaining Treatment, 79 IND. L.J. 1, 13-21 (2004) (discussion of Pouliot); See Blouin v.
Spitzer, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18243 (N.D. N.Y. 2001) (aftermath of Pouliot); See
Gilmore v. Finn, 527 S.E.2d 326 (Va. 2000) (aftermath of Finn); Cerminara, Musings,
supra note 62, at 366-67 (discussion of Finn).
65. See THE RIGHT TO DIE, supra note 10, at § 3.18.
66. See, e.g., Kathy L. Cerminara, Collateral Damage: The Aftermath of the Political
Cultural Wars in Schiavo, 29 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 279, 279-80 n. 2-6 (2007)
[hereinafter Cerminara, Collateral Damage] (listing numerous articles and books
published just within the year after Ms. Schiavo's death).
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accounts.6 7
Furthermore, Schiavo added a political dimension to a
dispute that normally would have been resolved privately or
through the judicial system. The disagreement in Schiavo would
ultimately involve not only the Florida courts, but also the
Florida legislature and executive branch, plus all branches of the
federal government.6 8 Although Schiavo did not affect end-of-life
decisionmaking law in Florida, it had a major impact on the
politics of end-of-life decisionmaking law and, as such,
influenced the Italian political response to Englaro.69
ADVANCE DIRECTIVES IN THE UNITED STATES: LIVING WILLS
VERSUS HEALTH CARE POWERS OF ATTORNEY
Ms. Schiavo's family members did not have the benefit of
an advance directive as they tried to discern whether she would
have wanted to receive medically supplied nutrition and
hydration as she lay in a PVS.70 Advance directives "are
mechanisms by which competent individuals plan for medical
decisionmaking at a future time when they might no longer
possess decisionmaking capacity."7' The term "advance
directive" can signify many different things. The term can refer
to a person's oral or written statements regarding the course of
treatment to be effectuated under certain conditions. It also can
refer to instruments containing such instructions such as
67. See Robert M. Walker & Jay Black, Terri Schiavo and Televised News: Fact or
Fiction?, in THE CASE OF TERRI SCHIAVO: ETHICS, POLITICS, AND DEATH IN THE 21ST
CENTURY 210, (Kenneth Goodman ed., 2010).
68. See Cerminara, Long Road to Peace, supra note 3, at 101. See also Cerminara,
Collateral Damage, supra note 66, at 282-88.
69. When the Schiavo case ended, the Englaro case was far from being resolved,
the two were quite similar, and references to the Schiavo case emerged in the
political struggles following one of the higher-level rulings in Englaro. See infra p.
328-60; see also FEDERICO GUSTAVO PIZZETTI, ALLE FRONTIERE DELLA VITA: IL
TESTAMENTO BIOLOGICO TRA VALORI COSTITUZIONALI E PROMOZIONE DELLA
PERSONA (2008).
70. In re Schiavo, No. 90-2908GD-003, slip op. at 4 (Fla. Pinellas County Ct. Feb,
11, 2000), available at http://www.miami.edu/ethics/schiavo/pdf files/021100-
TrialCtOrder_0200.pdf
71. THE RIGHT TO DIE, supra note 10, at §7.01[A].
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instructional directives (commonly referred to as living wills) or
proxy directives (referred to by a variety of names, including
health care powers of attorney). A living will is a written
instrument that provides instructions to health care providers
regarding the types of medical care individuals wish to receive
under certain stated conditions.72 A health care power of
attorney is an instrument pursuant to which an individual
appoints another person, generally referred to as a proxy, to
make health care decisions in the event that he or she lacks the
capacity to make medical treatment decisions.7 1
For a long time after Quinlan was decided in 1976,
considerable uncertainty existed concerning the validity and
enforceability of advance directives.74 California was the first
state to enact a living will statute in 1976, in an attempt to
prevent the type of litigation that occurred in Quinlan.7 By
expressly legitimizing living wills, the California statute
provided a mechanism for competent individuals to plan for the
type of treatment they wished to receive in the event that they
lacked the capacity to decide for themselves. Somewhat later,
state legislatures also began to enact health care power of
attorney statutes, granting individuals the right to appoint
proxies to make medical decisions on their behalf.76 Although
Ms. Schiavo could have designated a health care proxy to make
health care decision for her,77 or left a living will specifying her
72. Id. at §7.01 [B] [3].
73. Id. at §7.01[B][4].
74. Id. at §7.02[A].
75. Id. at §7.02[D].
76. Id. at §7.01[B].
77. Fla. Stat. § 765.202 (2008). Florida uses the term "surrogate", rather than
proxy" to identify a person an individual selects to make medical decisions on his
or her behalf. In contrast, other states use the term "surrogate" to identify a person
who acquires decisionmaking authority by operation of law. A "proxy" decision
maker in Florida refers to a person who has the authority, acquired by law, to make
medical decisions for an incapacitated individual without the individual in
question having appointed him or her as such However, other states use the term
"proxy" to refer to a person whom an incapacitated individual selects to make
medical decision through advance directives. See THE RIGHT TO DIE, supra note 10,
at §7.01[B][4], [6].
For the sake of clarity, this article will use the term "proxy" to refer to individuals
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wishes with respect to her end-of-life care,78 she did not.7 9 By the
time the Schiavo litigation began in 1998, both types of advance
directives were recognized and enforceable in Florida.8 o
SURROGATE81 DECISIONMAKING: SUBSTANTIVE STANDARD FOR
DECISIONMAKING VERSUS CLEAR AND CONVINCING
EVIDENTIARY STANDARD
Despite the fact that Ms. Schiavo had neither appointed a
health care surrogate nor left a living will, Florida law still
allowed a health care surrogate8 2 to elect to withhold or
withdraw life sustaining treatment for her if clear and
convincing evidence indicated that that she would have chosen
to do so.83 Florida Statute § 765.401(1) lists, in order of priority,
persons who may act as surrogate decision makers when a
patient has neither a living will nor a health care power of
attorney.84 As Ms. Schiavo's legal guardian, Mr. Schiavo was
first in line to make health care decisions for her.85 As her
appointed by the incapacitated individuals to make health care decisions on their
behalf through advance directives, while the term "surrogate" will be used to refer
to persons who acquire medical decisionmaking authority through operation of
law, rather than through advance directives.
78. Fla. Stat. § 765.301-308 (2008).
79. In re Guardianship of Schiavo, No. 90-2908GD-003, slip op. at 4 (Fla.
Pinellas County Ct. Feb, 11, 2000), available at http://www6.miami.edu/ethics/
schiavo/pdfjfiles/021100-TrialCtOrder.0200.pdf.
80. FLA. STAT. § 765.302 (1997) recognizes living wills, while FLA. STAT. §
765.202 (1997) recognizes health care surrogate designations.
81. In this context, the term "surrogate" refers to a person who makes health
care decisions on behalf of another when the person acquires the authority to act
through operation of law, rather than by advance directive. See supra note 77. See
also THE RIGHT TO DIE, supra note 10, at § 7.01[B][4], [6].
82. THE RIGHT TO DIE, supra note 10, at § 7.01[B][4], [6]. See also supra note 77
(describing Florida's terminology, i.e. proxy versus surrogate).
83. FLA. STAT. § 765.401(3) (1997).
84. Florida is not unique in having this type of statute. The primary purpose
for having this type of statute is to "make clear. . that the customary medical
professional practice of using family members to make decisions for patients who
lack decisionmaking capacity and who lack advance directives is legally valid, and
that ordinarily judicial proceedings need not be initiated for the appointment of a
guardian." THE RIGHT TO DIE, supra note 10, at §8.01. In Schiavo, Mr. Schiavo had
already been appointed her legal guardian, several years before the question of
withdrawing her medically supplied nutrition and hydration arose.
85. FLA. STAT. § 765.401(1)(a) (1997).
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spouse, Mr. Schiavo also was second in line to make health care
decisions on her behalf.86
Like many other surrogate decisionmaking statutes, the
Florida statute accords the surrogate decision maker broad
discretion to make health care decisions on behalf of the
patient.87 In matters relating to withholding or withdrawing life-
prolonging procedures, the Florida statute requires clear and
convincing evidence that a decision to withhold or withdraw is
one the patient would have made had the patient been
competent to make the determination.88  Thus, the statue
requires the surrogate to meet two distinct standards in making
the decision to withhold or withdraw life-prolonging procedures
for the patient: a substantive decisionmaking standard and an
evidentiary standard.
Florida has chosen substituted judgment as the applicable
substantive decisionmaking standard.89 It requires the surrogate
to make health care decisions based on what the surrogate
"reasonably believes the patient would have made under the
circumstances." 90 Determining a patient's wishes in accordance
with the substituted judgment standard is a holistic enterprise;
the surrogate decision maker is not limited to examining a living
will or other instructional document. Rather, the task when
using a substituted judgment standard of decisionmaking is
to determine what the patient would have wanted to
do had he or she considered the question at hand.
Evidence of precisely what the patient would have
wanted, in the form of written advance directives or
oral statements effectively constituting advance
directives, is useful, but it is not required. A decision
made pursuant to a substituted judgment standard can
be determined by asking what a patient would have
86. FLA. STAT. § 765.401(1)(b) (1997).
87. THE RIGHT TO DIE, supra note 10, at § 8.07.
88. FLA. STAT. § 765.401(3) (1997) (when there is no indication of what the
patient would have chosen, the statute allows the surrogate to decide to withdraw
or withhold life-prolonging treatment if the decision is in the patient's best interest.)
89. See FLA. STAT. § 765.401(2) (1997).
90. Id. For a discussion of other substantive decisionmaking standards used by
various jurisdictions, see THE RIGHT TO DIE, supra note 10, at § 4.02[A].
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wanted based on that patient's values, beliefs, and
attitudes. 91
This is distinct from the clear and convincing evidentiary
standard. A clear and convincing evidence evidentiary standard
requires the surrogate to provide enough evidence that
produces in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or
conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be
established, evidence so clear, direct and weighty and
convincing as to enable [the factfinder] to come to a
clear conviction, without hesitancy, of the truth of the
precise facts in issue.92
Many jurisdictions have adopted a clear and convincing
standard of proof in end-of-life cases,9 3 at least in part because
"particularly important personal interests are at stake." 94 In
Florida, had Ms. Schiavo completed a living will, that living will
presumptively would have constituted clear and convincing
evidence of her wishes.95 Because she did not, however, the
initial dispute in Schiavo centered on whether Ms. Schiavo would
have wanted to be kept alive through medically supplied
nutrition and hydration despite her condition.
THE LITIGATION
Sometime after Ms. Schiavo entered a PVS, the court
appointed Mr. Schiavo, her husband, as her guardian, a
determination Ms. Schiavo's parents, the Schindlers, did not
contest. Although Mr. Schiavo and the Schindlers initially
agreed on Ms. Schiavo's medical care, rifts began to develop. In
July of 1993, "the Schindlers unsuccessfully sought to remove
91. Kathy L. Cerminara, Tracking the Storm: The Far-Reaching Power of the Forces
Propelling the Schiavo Cases, 35 STETSON L. REV. 147, 165 (2005) [hereinafter,
Cerminara, Tracking the Storm] (footnotes omitted).
92. In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 441 (N.J. 1987) (quoting State v. Hodge, 471 A.2d
389, 393 (N.J. 1984)) (citations omitted). See In re Guardianship of Browning, 543 So.
2d 258, 273 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (adopting this definition of clear and
convincing standard).
93. THE RIGHT TO DIE, supra note 10, at § 3.27[A].
94. Matter of Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64, 72 (N.Y. 1981) (citing Addington v. Texas,
441 U.S. 418, 424 (1979)).
95. In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4, 16 (Fla. 1990).
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Mr. Schiavo from his court-appointed guardianship of Mrs.
Schiavo." 96 In 1998, Mr. Schiavo petitioned a Florida court to
decide whether Ms. Schiavo would want to be kept alive on the
percutaneous endoscopic gastrostomy (PEG) tube.97  Under
Florida law, Mr. Schiavo, acting as the guardian, could have
made this decision himself, or he could have asked the court to
make this determination for him;98 he chose to ask the court to
decide because he "recognized that he and the Schindlers would
disagree on whether to remove [Ms. Schiavo's] PEG tube." 99
Before issuing a decision, the court appointed a guardian ad
litem for Ms. Schiavo. By the time the litigation was over, in fact,
three guardians ad litem would examine her case. One of those
three concluded that both Mr. Schiavo and the Schindlers may
have been influenced by a medical malpractice award that
resulted from a lawsuit over her pre-cardiac arrest care. 00 That
guardian ad litem believed that Mr. Schiavo's conflict of interest,
coupled with his expression of a desire to withdraw treatment
only after the malpractice award, so colored his testimony that
he could not satisfy the clear and convincing evidentiary
standard in showing that Ms. Schiavo would have wanted her
PEG tube withdrawn. Although discounted by the trial court
hearing the case,101 and indeed although no court ever found a
conflict of interest in Schiavo,102 this guardian ad litem's opinion
highlights one stark contrast with the situation in Englaro. In
96. Cerminara, Long Road to Peace, supra note 3, at 103. See also Cerminara, Key
Events, supra note 5; See MARY SCHINDLER & AND ROBERT SCHINDLER, A LIFE THAT
MATTERS: THE LEGACY OF TERRI SCHIAVO - A LESSON FOR Us ALL 58-59 (2006)
(describing hiring a lawyer who "went after Michael's guardianship of Terri");
MICHAEL SCHIAVO WITH MICHAEL HIRSCH, TERRI: THE TRUTH 89 (2006) (describing
initial Schindler v. Schiavo pleadings, filed on July 29, 1993).
97. A PEG tube is a method by which liquid nutrition and hydration are
administered to patients. See Cerminara, Tracking the Storm, supra note 91, at 149
n.18.
98. See In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4, 16 (Fla. 1990). See also
Cerminara, Tracking the Storm, supra note 91, at 161-62.
99. Cerminara, Tracking the Storm, supra note 91, at 162.
100. In re Guardianship of Schiavo, No. 90-2908GD-003, slip op. at 2-4 (Fla.
Pinellas County Ct. Feb. 11, 2000).
101. Id. See also Cerminara, Tracking the Storm, supra note 91, at 161.
102. See Cerminara, Tracking the Storm, supra note 91, at 161.
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Englaro, no financial conflict of interest presented itself and the
sole Italian-trial-court-appointed guardian ad 1item agreed that
Ms. Englaro's PEG tube should be removed.
On February 11, 2000, the trial court approved Mr.
Schiavo's request that Ms. Schiavo's physicians withdraw the
PEG tube providing her with medically supplied nutrition and
hydration. First, the court determined "beyond all doubt" that
Ms. Schiavo was in a persistent vegetative state as defined in the
Florida statute. 03 Second, the court found that Ms. Schiavo
would have wished to have her PEG tube withdrawn under the
circumstances, in the process addressing all relevant information
(including explanations as to why it was discounting some
portions of evidence while crediting others).104
The Schindlers appealed this decision on three bases. First,
the Schindlers contended that the trial court should have
appointed another guardian ad litem to represent Ms. Schiavo in
the proceeding because of Mr. Schiavo's financial conflict of
interest.1 5 Second, they argued that the trial court had made its
decision based on Ms. Schiavo's best interest rather than
determining what Ms. Schiavo would have wanted in
accordance with the substituted judgment standard of
decisionmaking.10 6 Finally, they argued that the evidence
presented about Ms. Schiavo's wishes during trial did not meet
the "clear and convincing" evidentiary standard.107
In January 2001, the Florida Second District Court of Appeal
upheld the trial court's ruling that permitted the removal of Ms.
Schiavo's PEG tube. The appellate court dismissed the
103. In re Guardianship of Schiavo, No. 90-2908GD-003, slip op. at 6 (Fla.
Pinellas County Ct. Feb. 11, 2000) (order granting removal of Ms. Schiavo's PEG
tube).
104. Id. at 9.
105. In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 780 So. 2d 176, 178 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)
[hereinafter Schiavo 1], rev. denied, 789 So. 2d 348 (Fla. 2001).
106. This argument rested on the court's admission of certain evidence
regarding the results of certain social science survey of people's desires about end-
of-life decisionmaking. Schiavo 1, 780 So. 2d at 179. See also Cerminara, Tracking the
Storm, supra note 91, at 165-68.
107. Shiavo 1, 780 So. 2d at 179.
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Schindler's first argument because Mr. Schiavo was not serving
as the decision-maker in the proceeding but rather was asking
the court to make the decision.10 s Second, the appellate court
concluded that the trial court properly made a decision based on
what Ms. Schiavo would have wanted to have done.109 Finally, it
determined that the trial court had sufficient evidence to decide
that Ms. Schiavo would have wanted the PEG tube
withdrawn.110 The appellate court noted that while the clear and
convincing evidentiary standard is very high, the standard
"permits a decision in the face of inconsistent or conflicting
evidence.""' It concluded that "[t]he evidence [was]
overwhelming that [Ms. Schiavo was] in a permanent or
persistent vegetative state."112 The Florida Supreme Court
denied review of the Schindlers' appeal of the appellate court's
decision. 13
Ms. Schiavo's PEG's tube was removed in April 2001,114 but
was reinserted after the Schindlers filed a new lawsuit, resulting
in yet another trip up the judicial ladder and back down in
Florida. Several judicial opinions later, still on the losing end,
the Schindlers would shift their legal argument and cause a
political storm surrounding Ms. Schiavo's life and death.
THE POLITICAL FUROR
Well into the litigation, the Schindlers argued for the first
time that Ms. Schiavo was not in a persistent vegetative state
and that, rather than refusing medically supplied nutrition and
hydration, she would have chosen a medical procedure that
could improve her medical condition.115 After still more judicial
108. Id. at 178.
109. Id. at 179.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 177.
113. In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 789 So. 2d 348 (Fla. 2001).
114. In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 792 So. 2d 551, 555 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)
[hereinafter Schiavo II].
115. In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 800 So. 2d 640, 643-44 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
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proceedings, the trial court once again authorized the removal of
Ms. Schiavo's PEG tube.116  The Schindlers' unsuccessful
appeal'17 of this trial court ruling attracted amici curiae briefs
from representatives of various special interest groups, many of
which focused on disability rights and vitalist causes. Schiavo
became the bulls-eye in the target of interest-group politics.
At this point, the litigation transformed from a dispute
between private parties to one that involved a multitude of
special interest groups and their supporters, nearly causing a
constitutional crisis in the state of Florida. News media
coverage of the Schiavo case added to the political pressure on
Governor Jeb Bush and the Florida Legislature to intervene.
Thus, in October 2003, the Florida Legislature enacted a law
specifically addressing Ms. Schiavo's case, which became known
as "Terri's Law," authorizing Governor Bush to issue an
executive order requiring reinsertion of Ms. Schiavo's PEG
tube.xi8 Mr. Schiavo challenged "Terri's law," arguing that the
law was unconstitutional, and the Supreme Court of Florida
agreed, holding that "Terri's Law" violated the separation of
powers doctrine of the Florida Constitution.119 The political
response to Englaro in Italy would similarly create a
constitutional crisis of a different dimension there.
The political pressure not only affected Florida, but also
extended to the national level, driving the U.S. Congress to take
action on the Schiavo case. The U.S. House of Representatives
2001) [hereinafter Schiavo III].
116. In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 851 So. 2d 182, 185 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)
[hereinafter Schiavo IV].
117. Schiavo IV, 851 So. 2d at 187.
118. 2003 Fla. Laws Ch. 418, § 1 (reprinted in full in Bush v. Schiavo, 885 So.2d
321, 328-29 (Fla. 2004)) (held unconstitutional in Bush v. Schiavo, 885 So. 2d 321, 337
(Fla. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1121, 125 S. Ct. 1086 (2005)). See generally Barbara A.
Noah, Politicizing the End of Life: Lessons from the Schiavo Controversy, 59 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 107 (2005).
119. Bush v. Schiavo, 855 So. 2d 321, 337 (Fla. 2004). Specifically, the court held
that the law encroached upon the judiciary's power to decide cases. Id. at 332.
Furthermore, the court held that the legislature had unconstitutionally delegated its
legislative power to the governor by granting him unrestricted power to issue a
stay without defining standards to follow in deciding when and whether to issue or
end the stay. Id. at 336.
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Committee on Government Reform unsuccessfully asked the
Florida trial court to stay the order authorizing removal of Ms.
Schiavo's PEG tube. By contrast, Congress successfully passed
Senate Bill 686,120 which provided federal court jurisdiction
to hear, determine, and render judgment on a suit or
claim by or on behalf of Theresa Marie Schiavo for the
alleged violation of any right of Theresa Marie Schiavo
under the Constitution or laws of the United States
relating to the withholding or withdrawal of food,
fluids, or medical treatment necessary to sustain her
life. 121
President Bush signed the bill into private law on March 21,
2005.122 More litigation ensued,123 and it appeared at one point
as if the governor of Florida would send the Florida Department
of Children and Families into Ms. Schiavo's hospice to seize and
"rescue" her, 124 but the Schindlers were unable to have Ms.
120. Senate Bill 686 was a private bill passed for the relief of the parents of
Theresa Marie Schiavo. See An Act For the relief of the parents of Theresa Marie
Schiavo, S. 686, 109th Cong. (2005), available at http://www6.miami.edu/ethics
/schiavo/pdf files/032005-USSenateCompromise inSchiavo.pdf.
A private bill provides benefits to specified individuals (including
corporate bodies). Individuals sometimes request relief through private
legislation when administrative or legal remedies are exhausted. . If a
private bill is passed in identical form by both houses of Congress and is
signed by the president, it becomes a private law.
Legislation, Laws, and Acts, U.S. SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/legislative/
common/briefing/leg_1awsacts.htm (last visited Apr. 9, 2011).
121. See An Act For the relief of the parents of Theresa Marie Schiavo, supra note
120.
122. Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 357 F. Supp. 2d 1378, 1382 (M.D. Fla.),
affd, 403 F.3d 1223, 1229 (11th Cir.), reh'g en banc denied, 403 F.3d 1261, 1261 (11th
Cir.), stay denied, 544 U.S. 945 (2005). See Cerminara, Key Events, supra note 5.
123. Upon enactment of this law, the Schindlers filed suit in the United States
District Court for the Middle District of Florida and requested the judge to order
reinsertion of the PEG tube pending the federal claims asserted. The federal district
court judge refused to grant the preliminary injunction, reasoning that the
Schindlers were unlikely to succeed on any of the federal claims asserted. See
Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 357 F. Supp. 2d 1378, 1388 (M.D. Fla.), aff'd, 403
F.3d 1223 (11th Cir.), reh'g en banc denied, 403 F.3d 1261 (11th Cir. en banc), stay
denied, 125 S. Ct. 1692 (2005). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit and
the U.S. Supreme Court refused to reverse the district court's decision. See also
Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 358 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 1163 (M.D. Fla.), aff'd, 403
F.3d 1289, 1296 (11th Cir.), reh'g en banc denied, 404 F.3d 1270, 1271 (11th Cir. en
banc), reh'g denied, 404 F.3d 1282, 1283 (11th Cir.), stay denied, 544 U.S. 957 (2005).
124. Cerminara, Long Road to Peace, supra note 3, at 110.
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Schiavo's PEG tube reinserted. She passed away on March 31,
2005.125
Although Schiavo did not change the end-of-life
decisionmaking laws in Florida, Schiavo's impact on the politics
of end-of-life decisionmaking law cannot be overstated.126 Issues
that were once settled became unsettled during the political
upheaval that occurred during the Schiavo litigation.127 In
addition, subsequent events in Italy indicate that Schiavo's
political impact traveled across the Atlantic and affected yet
another end-of-life decisionmaking case there.
THE ENGLARO LITIGATION AND THE POLITICS OF END-OF-LIFE
DECISIONMAKING LAW IN ITALY
On January 18, 1992, approximately two years after Ms. Schiavo
entered a PVS, Eluana Englaro was involved in an automobile
accident in Italy that eventually left her in a PVS.128 Four years
after the accident, the Tribunale Lecco (the Trial Court) declared
Ms. Englaro incompetent and appointed her father, Beppino
Englaro (Mr. Englaro), as her guardian.129 For the next seventeen
years, Mr. Englaro would litigate to enforce what he considered
to be his daughter's wish to discontinue life-prolonging
treatment. Indeed, the length and path of Eluana Englaro's
litigation bears a striking resemblance to those of Terri Schiavo's
cases. But instead of the litigation resolving a dispute between
two private parties like Schiavo, Englaro involved the state
125. See Cerminara, Key Events, supra note 5.
126. See Cerminara, Collateral Damage, supra note 66, at 279-93; Cerminara,
Tracking the Storm, supra note 91, at 147-48.
127. Lois Shepherd, Terri Schiavo: Unsettling The Settled, 37 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 297,
299 301 (2006) (noting that the Schiavo cases had raised questions around three
topics: "the role of surrogate decision-making in cases of permanent vegetative
state; the relevance of the physical condition of the patient in questions of treatment
refusal; and the significance of artificial nutrition and hydration as the kind of
treatment refused").
128. Corte App. Milano, Sect. I Civ., 9 July 2008, g. 88/2008, 2 [hereinafter
Englaro IX] available at http://www.nsulaw.nova.edu/library-tech/library
/resources/local/milan/index.cfm.
129. Id.
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protesting the refusal of treatment. In fact, Englaro is a closer
comparison to Quinlan than Schiavo, both for that reason and
because Englaro represents Italy's first major decision on the
issue of withdrawing life sustaining treatment.
THE LITIGATION
In January of 1999, the Trial Court rejected Mr. Englaro's
request to discontinue Ms. Englaro's medically supplied
hydration and nutrition. The Trial Court held that Mr. Englaro's
request was incompatible with Article 2 of the Italian
Constitution, which the court interpreted as providing absolute
and imperative protection of the right to life.130 Mr. Englaro
appealed the Trial Court's decision to the Corte d'Appello di
Milano (Court of Appeal).'3' In December of that year, the Court
of Appeal issued a decree indicating that it would not hear the
appeal. It disposed of the case as a matter of law without
prejudice and stated that it would not hear the case based on
'voluntary jurisdiction.' The court concluded that it could not
hear the case because there was no code or statute directly
regulating the issue at hand to allow the court to decide whether
a party could make the determination to interrupt medically
supplied nutrition and hydration on behalf of an incompetent
person.132 This procedural posture stands in stark contrast to
Schiavo, where the law was clear and the case simply turned on
applying the facts of the case to well-established principles of
end-of-life decisionmaking law.
In February 2002, Mr. Englaro filed a new petition with the
Trial Court, again requesting permission to discontinue
medically supplied nutrition and hydration. Again, the Trial
Court rejected Mr. Englaro's request, based on the same
130. Id. (referring to Trib. Lecco, Persons, Minors and Family Sect., 1 Mar. 1999,
n. 59/99, 2 (Englaro I)).
131. Id. at 2-3 (referring to Corte App. Milano, Persons, Minors and Family Sec.,
31 Dec. 1999, n. 99/99, 2 [hereinafter Englaro II]).
132. Id. (referring to Englaro II, supra note 131, at 5-17).
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reasoning as the previous decision.133 Mr. Englaro asked the
Court of Appeal to review the Trial Court's decree, and in
October of 2003, the Court of Appeal dismissed the case for the
same reason. 134 This time, with the help of a new lawyer who
was a professor of Constitutional law, Mr. Englaro filed an
extraordinary recourse to Corte di Cassazione (Cassazione)
under Article 111 of the Constitution to review whether the
Court of Appeal had correctly interpreted and applied the law.135
The Cassazione issued its decision in April of 2005
dismissing the case, but for a different reason than the Court of
Appeal.136 The court determined that it could not decide such an
important and deeply personal issue as refusal of life-sustaining
treatment without a judicially appointed special guardian (a
guardian ad litem) participating in the proceeding to ensure that
the decision to refuse life-sustaining treatment would have been
what the incompetent patient would have decided if competent.
Because decisions about life-sustaining treatments are deeply
personal, the court ruled that a general guardian cannot be
authorized to act on the behalf of his or her ward, but must act
"with" the incompetent patient, so to speak, to try to actualize
his or her will. Furthermore, since the general guardian might
have a conflict of interest, and because the decision is extremely
important, the court ruled that it was necessary to appoint
another, special, guardian (a guardian ad litem) in order to
establish that the previously appointed general guardian was
accurately reconstructing the will of the patient. A later decision
133. Id. at 3 (referring to Trib. Lecco, Sect. II, 15 Jul. 2002, n. 868/2002, 3-7
[hereinafter Englaro III]).
134. Id. (referring to Corte App. Milano, Persons, Minors and Family Sect., 17
Oct. 2003, n. 321/02, 1-17 [hereinafter Englaro IV]).
135. The Corte di Cassazione (the Supreme Court of Cassation) is the "highest
court in civil and criminal matters, and reviews only errors of law.. The function of
the Supreme Court is not only that of reviewing appellate or non-appealable
judgments, [but the court also] assures the exact observance and the uniform
interpretation of the law, [and] the unity of national law." Vincenzo Varano,
Machinery of Justice, in INTRODUCTION TO ITALIAN LAW 99, 108 (Jeffrey S. Lena &
Ugo Mattei eds., 2002).
136. Englaro IX, supra note 128, at 3 (referring to Cass., sect. I civil, 20 Apr. 2005,
n. 8291, 1 [hereinafter Englaro V]).
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of this same court demonstrated that the true issue was not
whether the guardian could act as a proxy decisionmaker on
behalf of the incompetent patient, but rather whether the wishes
of the incompetent patient could be ascertained and whether
acting in conformance with those wishes would be lawful.
In response to the Cassazione's decision, Mr. Englaro filed a
petition requesting appointment of a guardian ad litem in
September of 2005. The court appointed an attorney, Franca
Alessio, as guardian ad litem, and she agreed with Mr. Englaro
that Ms. Englaro's medically supplied nutrition and hydration
should be discontinued. Once again, however, the Trial Court
rejected Mr. Englaro's request to discontinue life sustaining
treatment, holding that the guardian could not decide to
withdraw medically supplied life-sustaining treatment in place
of, or for, the incompetent patient, even with the consent of the
guardian ad litem.137 Here, the court reasoned that the
incompetent patient lacked a constitutional right of autonomy
and a constitutional right to consent to a medical treatment. In
addition, in the opinion of the court, medically supplied
hydration and nutrition was not a medical treatment but was
ordinary care that could not be withheld or withdrawn unless
death was imminent. As a patient in a PVS, Ms. Englaro's death
was not imminent; patients in PVSs can live for decades.3 8
Near the end of 2006, the Court of Appeal reversed the Trial
Court's decision, declaring that Articles 357 and 424 of the Civil
Code vest the legal representative of a person who has been
declared incompetent with the power to care for the
incompetent person. Nevertheless, the court dismissed Mr.
Englaro's petition to withdraw life-sustaining treatment, holding
that the evidence was insufficient to clearly indicate that Ms.
Englaro would have wanted to terminate her medically supplied
nutrition and hydration.139 Mr. Englaro appealed the Court of
137. Id. (referring to Trib. Lecco, sect. I civil, 20 Dec. 2005, n. 1094/05, 6-21
[hereinafter Englaro VI]).
138. See BRYAN JENNETT, THE VEGETATIVE STATE: MEDICAL FACTS, ETHICAL AND
LEGAL DILEMMAS 66 (2002).
139. Englaro IX, supra note 128, at 10 (referring to Corte App. Milano, sect. I
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Appeal's decision to the Cassazione.
THE CASSAZIONE SPEAKS (ENGLARO VIII)140
On October 16, 2007, the Cassazione issued a decision that
would transform end-of-life decisionmaking law in Italy.141  In
that decision, the court held that judges can authorize removal
of medically supplied life-sustaining treatment for patients who
have been declared incompetent when two conditions are met:
(1) it is clear that the patient is in a permanent vegetative state
(PVS), judged by scientific standards recognized at the
international level, and (2) it can be determined by clear and
convincing evidence that the patient would not wish to be kept
alive through artificial means, based on the patient's personality,
lifestyle, and conviction, through the representative of the
patient. 142
civil, 16 Dec. 2006, [hereinafter Englaro VII]).
140. See generally Cass., sect. I civil, 16 Oct. 2007, n. 21748 [hereinafter Englaro
VIII], available at http://www.nsulaw.nova.edu/library-tech/library/resources
/local/milan/index.cfm.
141. See id. at 1. Shortly before this Englaro decision, Italian courts had been
inhospitable, to say the least, to pleas for authorization of withdrawal of life-
sustaining treatment. See, e.g., Trib. Rome, ordinance 16 Dec. 2006, Piergiorgio Welby
c. Antea Associazione Onlus (refusing to order a physician to follow the wishes of a
patient who wished to be disconnected from a ventilator). For a comparison
between Englaro and Welby, see C. Tripodina, Il risvolto negativo del diritto alla salute:
il diritto di rifiutare le cure. Studio in prospettiva comparata di due recenti casi italiani: il
caso Welby e il caso Englaro, in SISTEMI COSTITUZIONALI, DIRITTO ALLA SALUTE E
ORGANIZZAZIONE SANITARIA (R. Balduzzi ed., 2009).
142. Englaro VIII, supra note 140, at 19-20. The Cassazione rejected Mr. Englaro's
argument that the request to discontinue life sustaining treatment could be
grounded in the concept of "accanimento terapeutico." Loosely translated,
"accanimento terapeutico" is analogous to the legal/ethical/moral concept of futile
medical treatment. THE RIGHT TO DIE, supra note 10, at § 13. The Italian
deontological code (i.e., the statue that governs the practice of medicine in Italy)
allows physicians to lawfully interrupt, or in some cases, refrain from administering
treatment to patients if the physicians determine that the procedure would be
accanimento terpeutico. To illustrate, if an imminently terminal cancer patient suffers
from a cardiac arrest, administering cardiopulmonary resuscitation would be an
"accanimento terapeutico." Whether a particular treatment is accanimento terapeutico
must be determined by an objective standard and must be decided by the physician
or the law. Since a patient in a PVS is not "terminal," providing life sustaining
treatment for the patient cannot objectively be considered accanimento terapeutico.
Furthermore, a subjective determination of a patient's "quality of life" cannot be a
consideration in determination of accanimento terapeutico.
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The Cassazione remanded the case to the Court of Appeal
to determine whether the evidence presented would clearly
indicate that Ms. Englaro would wish to discontinue medically
supplied hydration and nutrition. On remand, the Court of
Appeal, after consideration of all the facts and evidence
presented in the case, granted Mr. Englaro's request to
discontinue Ms. Englaro's medically supplied hydration and
nutrition.43
THE POLITICAL RESPONSE
Similar to Schiavo in America, Englaro VIII and IX created a
political furor in Italy,'4 prompting the Italian Parliament to act
much as the Florida and federal legislatures were prompted to
act regarding Ms. Schiavo's treatment. The Chamber of
Deputies and the Senate of the Republic filed an appeal to the
Corte costituzionale della Repubblica Italiana (Constitutional
Court) 45 alleging that the Cassazione's October 16, 2007,
decision and the Court of Appeal's decision in July 2008 violated
the Italian Constitution. They asserted that the courts had
violated the separation of powers provision in the Constitution
by creating new laws in the area of end-of-life decisionmaking.
The legislature claimed that since the courts' decisions were not
based on interpretation of any laws in force at the time, the
courts had overstepped the boundary between creating law,
which is exclusively in the realm of the Parliament, and
143. Englaro IX, supra note 128, at 28.
144. See Richard Owen, Death of Coma Woman a Crime: Vatican, THE AUSTRALIAN,
Feb. 11, 2009, at 32; Rachel Donadio, Death Ends Coma Case that Set Off Furor in Italy,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2009, at A7; Day & McVeigh, supra note 3, at 8 (describing
Englaro as exposing "faultlines that run through Italian society, with politicians,
campaigners and the church battling for the country's soul"); Peter Popham, Church
Fury as Coma Woman Allowed to Die: Italian Court Grants Father Right to End
Daughter's Life, THE INDEPENDENT (LONDON), Nov. 14, 2008, at 32.
145. In Italy, the Constitutional Court conducts judicial review of legislation.
This body, separate from the Cassazione and composed of fifteen judges, is vested
with the power to review whether a national law, regional law, or government acts
having the force of law violates the Italian Constitution. See Mario Comba,
Constitutional Law, in INTRODUCTION TO ITALIAN LAW 31, 53-55 (Jeffrey S. Lena &
Ugo Mattei eds., 2002).
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interpreting law, which is the proper role of the court.14 1
The Constitutional Court disagreed with the Parliament. It
concluded that the substance of the Parliament's argument
amounted to an attack on the judicial reasoning of the case, in
that the members of Parliament advanced numerous criticisms
regarding the courts' selection, use, and interpretation of
important legal materials within their decisions.147 The court
ruled that the selection, use, and interpretation of legal materials
are all within the realm of the judiciary, and courts engaging in
those activities are not encroaching upon the powers of the
Parliament.148 Furthermore, the court stated that the Parliament
could still adopt a specific law regarding end-of-life
decisionmaking within the constitutional framework.149
Therefore, the Constitutional Court declared the Parliament's
petition inadmissible.
In addition to the Parliamentary response, the decision also
prompted other official actions. The General Public Prosecutor
of Milan protested against the judgment of the Court of Appeal
of Milan (Englaro IX), but the Cassazione ruled that he lacked
standing to challenge Englaro IX.1so Additionally, in response to
the decisions, the Italian Health Minister sent inspectors to visit
the clinic where Ms. Englaro lay.151 The Minister also declared
146. The interaction and relationship between creating law and interpreting law
is complex in a Civil Law legal system. See JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN & ROGELIO
PEREZ-PERDOMO, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL
SYSTEMS OF EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 20-26, 34-47 (2007).
147. Corte Cost., 8 Oct. 2008, n. 334, 7, available at http://www.nsulaw.nova.edu/
library-tech/library/resources/local/milan/index.cfm. For a comment, see R.
Romboli, Il conflitto fra poteri dello Stato sulla vicenda E.: un caso di evidente
inammissibilita, in FORO ITALIANO 49 (2009); R. Bin, Se non sale in cielo, non saraforse
un raglio d'asino? (a proposito dell'ord. 334/2008), in FORUM DI QUADERNI
COSTITUZIONALI, available at www.forumcostituzionale.it.
148. Corte Cost., 8 Oct. 2008, n. 334, 7, available at http://www.nsulaw.nova.edu/
library-tech/library/resources/local/milan/index.cfm.
149. Id.
150. Cass., united sections, 13 Nov. 2008, n. 27145 (Englaro X).
151. See Silvia Aloisi, Woman in Italian Right-to-Die Case Dies, REUTERS UK, Feb.
9, 2009, available at http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKTRE5185W220090209. See also
Peter Popham, Italian Coma Woman's Death Ends Berlusconi's Bid to Keep Her Alive:
Senators Thwarted in Bid to Fast-Track Law to Replace Force-Feeding Tubes, THE
INDEPENDENT (LONDON), Feb. 10, 2009, at 20 (describing campaign to "threaten[]
326 [Vol. 12
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that medically supplied nutrition and hydration constituted
ordinary care and not a medical treatment. In doing so, the
Minister attempted to invoke the United Nations Convention for
the protection of the rights of persons with disabilities in order
to shift Englaro's legal question from the issue of the right to
consent to or refuse medical interventions, to the issue of
protection of persons with disabilities.15 2 The European Court of
Human Rights (ECHR) issued a judgment of inadmissibility
against the petition presented by groups of Italian citizens and
associations that argued Englaro IX violated the European
Convention of Human Rights.153
Englaro VIII and Englaro IX also prompted the General
Health Director of the Lombardy Region, vested with the
region's executive power, to instruct organizations within the
clinics which agreed to supervise the final stages of Eluana's treatment and the
replacement of food with sedatives"); Day & McVeigh, supra note 3, at 8 (describing
the actions of Italy's Minister of Labour, Health & Social Policies (Welfare) in
"threaten[ing] any clinic that helped Eluana to die with financial ruin, or in his
words 'unimaginable consequences'"). The clinic in which Ms. Englaro eventually
died was a private institution that did not receive public funding. See id.
152. Minister of Labor, Health & Social Policies (Welfare), Address to the
Presidents of Regions and Autonomous Provinces of Trento and Bolzano on Stati
vegetativi, nutrizione e idratazione ("Vegetative states, nutrition and hydration") (Dec.
16, 2008). For a commentary, see Federico Gustavo Pizzetti, L'atto del Ministro
Sacconi sugli stati vegetativi, nutrizione e idratazione, alla luce dei principi di diritto
affermati dalla Cassazione nel caso Englaro, 84 ASTRID RASSEGNA (Jan. 12, 2009). This
act of the Minister of Labor, Health & Social Policies (Welfare), which is
administrative rather than legislative, was directed and addressed to the Regions
and Autonomous Provinces in an effort to ensure that public health facilities
guarantee that medically supplied nutrition and hydration be provided, even when
patient had expressed his or her desire not to receive it. An association of citizens
called "Movimento Difesa del Cittadino" has protested before the Regional
Administrative Tribunal for Latium, asking those administrative judges to nullify
the Minister's act on the grounds that it violates articles 2 and 32 of the Italian
Constitution, articles 1 and 3 of European Charter of Fundamental Rights, and
article 1 of Act n. 180/1978. Another group of citizens, the "Movimento per la Vita,"
has intervened into the legal dispute "ad opponendum," and the administrative
tribunal, has ruled that it lacks jurisdiction over the matter. See Administrative
Tribunal for Latium Region, sez. III quarter, n. 8650/2009. Indeed, in Italy, when an
individual's substantive right is at stake and the matter is not within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the administrative justice, civil judges rather than administrative
tribunals possess jurisdiction.
153. Press Release, European Court of Human Rights, Inadmissibility Decision,
Ada Rossi and Others v. Italy (Dec. 22, 2008) (The court dismissed the case,
reasoning that Englaro IX had not affected the parties).
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regional health service, including hospices such as the one in
which Ms. Englaro was a patient, that they could not withdraw
or withhold medically supplied nutrition and hydration from
patients. Mr. Englaro argued against this "administrative act"
before the administrative tribunal, and the administrative judges
agreed with his argument. When there is a specific judgment
from a civil court (and, in this case of the highest civil court, the
Cassazione), recognizing an individual's fundamental,
constitutional right, the executive branch must respect that right
as if it had been granted by a statutory source of law. The
executive could not prevent individuals from securing and
exercising the right.15 4
Eluana Englaro died on February 9, 2009, after the PEG tube
was removed. 155
Englaro VIII and Englaro IX revolutionized Italian end-of-life
decisionmaking law. Prior to these decisions, a patient in a PVS
had no recourse or mechanism through which to direct the
withdrawal or withholding of life sustaining treatment. The
next section will explore the judicial reasoning of Englaro VIII,
comparing and contrasting it with the reasoning of U.S. end-of-
life decisionmaking law, including the judicial opinions in
Schiavo.
SIMILAR PATHS BUT SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCES
Although the Englaro litigation took a path very similar to
Schiavo, there are many significant differences between the two
cases. As opposed to Schiavo, which was a usual end-of-life
decisionmaking case presenting issues involving well-settled
Florida law, the end-of-life decisionmaking laws facing Mr.
Englaro in his quest to withdraw Ms. Englaro's treatment were
154. The administrative tribunal also held that the right to refuse medically
supplied nutrition and hydration is of a fundamental, constitutional nature and the
right had to be respected even if a guardian was communicating the refusal. It
additionally ruled that the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment does not
constitute euthanasia, which it defined as the use of a "behavior intentionally aimed
to shorten life and that causes itself positively the death."
155. See Owen, supra note 144, at 32.
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far from settled. Ms. Englaro's litigation proceeded in an
uncertain legal environment.156 Indeed, the Court of Appeals
denied Mr. Englaro's first two petitions requesting
discontinuation of life-sustaining treatment because it concluded
that there were no laws or regulations that applied to the issues
before the court. And, in fact, no specific piece of legislation
authorizing withdrawal of treatment existed. In existence,
however, were general legislative provisions that were
potentially applicable and constitutional clauses that were on
point. In this respect, Englaro VIII is much more like Quinlan; the
Cassazione based its ruling on "higher-level," constitutional
authority without specific statutory provisions in effect.
In the absence of any parliamentary act specifically
authorizing end-of-life decisionmaking, the Cassazione arguably
engaged in lawmaking based on its interpretation of the
constitution, the ultimate source of law. As such, the
Cassazione's decision was susceptible to an attack from the
Parliament, arguing that the judiciary had engaged in an
impermissible activity. 15 7 Even in the civil law legal system,
however, the role of the judiciary is to interpret the law and the
156. In some respects, "end-of-life decisionmaking law" did not exist in Italy
before Englaro VII; that was precisely the reason the Court of Appeal in Englaro
dismissed Mr. Englaro's claim. In other respects, however, "end-of-life
decisionmaking law" did exist. The Constitutional Court ruled that the Cassazione
did not create law (which would have violated the separation of powers doctrine)
but instead applied law that already was in force. So it would be accurate to say
that, prior to Englaro, "end-of-life decisionmaking" law existed in Italy at a
constitutional level and at a supranational level (through the Oviedo Convention on
Human Rights). Because Italy has (and had prior to Englaro) criminal laws
punishing assisted suicide and homicide of even persons who ask to be killed,
commentators who opposed the ruling of the Cassazione argued that "end-of-life
decisionmaking" law existed and they forbid withholding or withdrawing life-
sustaining treatment. This paradox highlights the controversial nature of end-of-
life decisionmaking laws. It also emphasizes the similarity between Englaro VIII
and Quinlan. The only specific piece of legislation governing the actions Mr.
Englaro contemplated appeared in the Criminal Code, but general principles and
constitutional provisions also applied. This was the same dilemma Mr. Quinlan
took to the New Jersey Supreme Court.
157. The interaction between a judge interpreting law and the legislature
creating law is complex in a civil-law legal system. See MERRYMAN & P REZ-
PERDOMO, supra note 146, at 34-47.
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Constitution is the ultimate source of law.158 Hence, the
Constitutional Court held that the Cassazione had the power to
interpret the Constitution in a manner as to provide incompetent
patients the right to have life-sustaining treatment withdrawn or
withheld based upon what they would have wanted if they had
been competent to make their own decisions.159
INFORMED CONSENT: COMMON LAW VERSUS CONSTITUTIONAL
SOURCES
Similar to the U.S. Supreme Court's decisions preceding
Schiavo,160 the Cassazione in Englaro established the right of
individuals to refuse life-sustaining treatment pursuant to the
doctrine of informed consent. Unlike the U.S. Supreme Court,
which has thus far refrained from expressly finding a
constitutional source for the right, the Cassazione found the
principle of informed consent in the Italian Constitution. The
court declared that the principle of informed consent is derived
from the following articles in the Italian Constitution: "in Article
2, which protects and promotes the fundamental rights of the
human person, of her identity and dignity; in Article 13, which
proclaims the inviolability of personal liberty. . . and in Article
32, which protects health as a fundamental right of the
individual. ... "161 According to the Cassazione, consent is
intricately linked to the concept of personal and physical liberty
as expressed in Article 13 of the Italian Constitution, which
protects individuals from being detained, inspected, or searched
against their will. In fact, in addition to Article 32 of the
Constitution, Act no. 833/1978, Article 33 declares that medical
treatment is voluntary and treatment is compulsory only when
158. See Comba, supra note 145, at 31, 53-55; MERRYMAN & PEREZ-PERDOMO,
supra note 146, at 34-47; see also A. VEDASCHI, Italian Sources of Law, in
INTRODUCTION TO ITALIAN PUBLIC LAW, (F. Ferrari ed., Giuffre 2008), especially
chapter XI, 220-21.
159. Corte Cost., 8 Oct. 2008, n. 334, 7.
160. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997); see Vacco v. Quill, 521
U.S. 793 (1997); see Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
161. Englaro VIII, supra note 140, at 9.
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prescribed by law.16 2
The Italian doctrine of informed consent thus diverges from
the doctrine of informed consent in the U.S. in that informed
consent law in the U.S. has its origin and basis in the common
law of tort.16 3 As stated previously, locating the right to make
end-of-life decisions in the Constitution is significant in that the
legislature cannot override constitutional rights, whereas it can
always override legal decisions emanating from common-law
sources.'1' While the U.S. Supreme Court has defined that right
as stemming from the tort law of battery (i.e., as arising from the
right to be free from unwanted bodily touching),'65 the
Cassazione determined that Italy's constitution guarantees its
citizens the right to make deeply personal choices about the
medical treatments they want to receive or refuse, as part of
their personal conception of human dignity, at least when life is
artificially prolonged as the result of the medical treatment in
question.166
In this respect, the Cassazione's opinion is much more
theoretically expansive than the U.S. Supreme Court's vision of
the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment has been thus far.
The Cassazione's decision calls to mind a famous passage from
the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Caseyl67 describing the liberty
interest in autonomy protecting reproductive choices under the
U.S. Constitution:
These matters, involving the most intimate and
162. The Cassazione cited two Constitutional Court decisions, 258/1994 and
118/1996, permitting the government to provide treatment where non-treatment
would cause harm to the health of others and the treatment provided does not
cause harm and benefit the health of the patient. See id. at 11.
163. See Cerminara, Three Female Faces, supra note 17, at 97.
164. See id. at 99; see Baron, supra note 35, at 121 (2004).
165. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 724.
166. See Englaro VIII, supra note 140, at 10 (stating "Consent is tied to the moral
liberty of the subject and to his self-determination, as well as to his physical liberty
defined as the right to the respect of his own corporeal integrity, which are all
aspects of the personal liberty proclaimed inviolable by Article 13 of the
Constitution.").
167. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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personal choices a person may make in a lifetime,
choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are
central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to
define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of
the universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs
about these matters could not define the attributes of
personhood were they formed under compulsion of the
State.161
Similarly, the Italian justices have recognized that both the
right to life and the right to bodily integrity derive from a matrix
of human dignity 6 9 implicitly recognized by Articles 2, 13 and
32 of the Italian Constitution.170 The substance of the human
168. Id. at 851.
169. For an introduction to the "constitutional," "value," and legal concept of
human dignity in Italian law, see A. PIROZZOLI, IL VALORE COSTITUZIONALE DELLA
DIGNITA. UN'INTRODUZIONE (2007); LA TUTELA DELLA DIGNITA DELL'UOMO (E.
Ceccherini eds., Editoriale Scientifica 2008); U. VINCENTI, DIRITTI E DIGNITA UMANA
(Laterza 2009).
170. See Corte Cost., 9 July 1996, n. 238; see also Corte Cost., sent. 23 Dec. 2008, n.
438 (affirming that "informed consent" to a medical intervention shall be
considered a constitutional principle representing the synthesis of two
fundamental, specific constitutional rights of the person recognized and guaranteed
by Art. 2, 13, and 32 of the Constitution: the right of autonomy and self-
determination in medical choices arising from the right of personal liberty, and the
right of health and physical and psychological welfare). Most recently, see Cass.,
criminal joint sections, 18 Dec. 2008, n. 2437 (affirming that the principle of
informed consent is paramount and firmly grounded in the Constitution as a
declination of the fundamental principles of human dignity, personal identity and
autonomy, and that medical activity, in order to be lawful, generally must be
grounded in informed consent from a competent patient). See also Cass., sect. IV
criminal, 14 Mar. 2008, n. 11335; Cass., sect. III civil, 14 Mar. 2006, n. 5444.
About the Italian doctrine of informed consent for medical operations, see A.
SANTOSUOSSO, CORPO E LIBERTA, (Raffaello Cortina 2001); G. MONTANARI
VERGALLO, IL RAPPORTO MEDICO-PAZIENTE, (Giuffre 2008); P. VERONESI, IL CORPO E
LA COSTITUZIONE, (Giuffre 2007); S. TORDINI CAGLI, PRINCIPIO DI
AUTODETERMINAZIONE E CONSENSO DELL'AVENTE DIRITTO, (Bononia University
Press 2008); about art. 32 Cost. and its interpretations, see B. Caravita di Toritto, La
Disciplina Costituzionale della Salute, DIRITTO E SOCIETA 52 (1984); A. D'Aloia, Diritto
di Morire? La Problematica Dimensione Costituzionale della <fine della vita>>, POLITICA
DEL DIRITTo 611 (1998); M. Luciani, II Diritto Costituzionale alla Salute, DIRITTO E
SOCIETA 780 (1980); M. Portigliatti Barbos, Diritto di Riftutare le Cure (voce), 4
DIGESTO. DISCIPLINE PENALISTICHE 32 (Utet 1990); 1. NICOTRA GUERRERA, "VITA" E
SISTEMA DI VALORI NELLA COSTITUZIONE, (Giuffre 1997); G.U. Rescigno, Dal Diritto
di Rifiutare un Determinato Trattamento Sanitario, Secondo l'art. 32, co. 2 Cost., Al
Principio di Autodeterminazione Intorno alla Propria Vita, DIRITTO PUBBLICO 85 (2008);
A. Simoncini & E. Longo, Articolo 32, 1 COMMENTARIO ALLA COSTITUZIONE
ITALIANA, 655 (R. Bifulco et al., eds., Utet 2006).
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dignity the Italian Constitution guarantees as a fundamental
principle and value (the "source" of every other right protected
by the Constitution) belongs to each individual, to determine on
his or her own terms. Therefore, it must be combined with the
constitutional principle and value of personal identity, 171 from
which springs the right of every person to develop his or her
own personality, protected by Article 2 of the Constitution.172
The result is that every person has a liberty right to accept or
refuse a medical treatment that is not imposed by the law for
public health reasons and that the interest in preservation of
life 73 does not always limit that liberty.174
This decision reaches much farther than does American
constitutional jurisprudence. After the U.S. Supreme Court
assumed the existence of a constitutional right to refuse life-
sustaining treatment in Cruzan,175 the Court later denied in
Glucksberg that the right it had recognized was "deduced from
abstract concepts of personal autonomy." 76 When asked
whether a state law prohibiting assistance to terminally ill
patients in ending their lives was unconstitutional, Justice
171. About the legal protection of the several dimensions of "personal identity"
at the constitutional level with respect to new developments in biotechnology, see
Paolo Zatti, Dimensioni ed Aspetti dell'Identith nel Diritto Privato Attuale, 4 LA NUOVA
GIURISPRUDENZA CIVILE COMMENTATA, 4-5 (2007).
172. About various aspects of the development of each personality in a world
characterized by technological development and the area covered by new
constitutional human rights (especially for thoughts about the end of life
decisionmaking in Italy and abroad), see STEFANO RODOTA, LA VITA E LE REGOLE.
TRA DIRITTO E NON DIRITTO, (Feltrinelli 2006).
173. Giorgio Lombardi, Intervista sul Caso Terry Schiavo, 3 QUADERNI
COSTITUZIONALI, 695, 695-700 (2005), distinguishes between a "natural life" and an
"artificial, sustained" one, observing that a person in a vegetative state is no longer
able to autonomously develop. He argues that a clinical decision adopted by a
patient exercising his or her liberty right to consent to or refuse therapy, may
choose or refuse to endure the latter ("artificial sustained") existence.
174. See NICOLA OCCHIOCUPO, LIBERAZIONE E PROMOZIONE DELLA PERSONA
UMANA: UNITA DI VALORI NELLA PLURALITA DI POSIZIONI, (Giuffr6 1988); V. Baldini,
Sviluppi della Medicina e Dialettica dei Diritti Costituzionali, 1 STUDI IN ONORE DI
GIANNI FERRARA 240 (Giappichelli 2005).
175. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 723 (1997) (noting that the Court
in Cruzan assumed but did not hold that the right existed).
176. Id. at 725 (declining to hold that a constitutional right to having assistance
in ending one's life existed).
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Rehnquist, writing for the Court, ruled that the right at issue in
Cruzan had been grounded in the tort right to be free from
nonconsensual touching. Specifically addressing the argument
that the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment emanated from
the broadly defined liberty interest described in Casey, the Court
concluded that simply because "many of the rights and liberties
protected by the Due Process Clause sound in personal
autonomy does not warrant the sweeping conclusion that any
and all important, intimate, and personal decisions are so
protected . . . ."177
Substantial differences at the heart of the two countries'
legal systems underlie the distinction. For example, differences
between the U.S Constitution and the Italian Constitution may
have caused this divergent path. The Cassazione in Englaro
ruled that it was the combination of express Italian
constitutional provisions protecting human identity, dignity,
and liberty that underlay the right to refuse treatment in Ms.
Englaro's case. Indeed, the Italian Constitution provides more
enumerated rights than does the U.S. Constitution.17 8 Even
generally speaking, with fewer enumerated rights with which to
work, courts recognize a more limited category of fundamental
rights in the U.S.179 In particular, the Court in Cruzan (and, later,
interpreting Cruzan) worked not with specifically enumerated
rights, but rather with a general Due Process Clause. In
interpreting Cruzan in Glucksberg, the U.S. Supreme Court sent
177. Id. at 727 (citing San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1, 33-35 (1973)).
178. There are 42 articles in the Italian Constitution, many of which enumerate
the rights and duties of Italian citizens. The U.S. Constitution does not impose any
duties upon its citizens, yet, even focusing solely on rights, the contrast between the
two constitutions is striking. The following are some of the rights the Italian
Constitution recognizes that are not recognized as fundamental rights in the U.S.:
the right to health (Article 32), the right to education (Article 34), the right to
welfare (Article 38) and the right to strike (Article 40).
179. While the Bill of Rights enumerates some fundamental rights, the U.S.
Supreme Court has recognized others that the Constitution does not explicitly set
forth. For further discussion on this issue, see Chapter 5 (The Structure of the
Constitution's Protection of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties) and Chapter 8 (Fundamental
Rights Under Due Process and Equal Protection) in ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 523, 524, 943-44, 1040-41 (3d ed. 2009).
334 [Vol. 12
2011] SCHIAVO REVISITED? 335
an unmistakable signal that it will not interpret the U.S.
Constitution's general liberty interest to encompass concerns
about human identity and dignity with respect to all matters. In
contrast, working with enumerated rights, the Cassazione
recognized that medical decisionmaking is a matter of identity
and dignity when those specified Italian constitutional rights
combine with the constitutional right to health. 8 o
Similarly, differences in the type of legal system in effect in
Italy and the U.S. also contributed to the Cassazione's locating
the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment in the Italian
Constitution. It would be impossible to establish a continually
developing law of informed consent using tort-law principles in
this sort of case in Italy for two reasons. First, while tort law
does exist in Italy, it arises out of provisions of the Civil Code
relating to compensation for harm done to others, not relating to
medical decisionmaking for incompetent patients by their
guardians.' 8 Second, while the Cassazione's interpretation of the
statutory scheme and the Italian Constitution would be
persuasive to other Italian courts, in a civil-law system such as
180. The Cassazione will not, however, follow the concepts of human identity,
dignity and liberty as far as proponents of the Casey formulation of the U.S.
Constitutional right had urged the U.S. Supreme Court to follow them. When the
Court in Glucksberg refused to follow Casey with respect to end-of-life
decisionmaking, it did so in response to arguments that human dignity, liberty and
autonomy required a declaration that a state statute prohibiting assistance to
terminally ill patients in dying was unconstitutional. The Court refused to declare
that statute unconstitutional, and the Cassazione has similarly stated that it would
not find a right to assistance in dying in the Italian Constitution. See Glucksberg, 521
U.S. 702; Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997); Englaro VIII, supra note 140.
An American court working with multiple enumerated rights at the state
constitutional level has ruled that the combination of state constitutional rights to
human dignity and privacy results in "a competent terminally ill patient ha[ving]
the constitutional right to die with dignity" which invalidates state statutes that
prevent such a patient from receiving assistance in dying. See Baxter v. State, 2008
Mont. Dist. LEXIS 482, at *29 (D. Ct. Mont. 2008).
181. Article 2043 of the Civil Code states: "Any fraudulent, malicious, or
negligent act that causes an unjustified injury to another obliges the person who has
committed to act to pay damages." THE ITALIAN CIVIL CODE 140 (Susanna Beltramo
ed., 2010) [hereinafter CIVIL CODE]. Combined with Article 32 of the Italian
Constitution, assuring citizens a right to health, physicians may be held liable for
operating on patients without their consent. The Englaro case did not arise in the
context of a lawsuit against a physician, which would appear to render these Italian
tort law principles inapplicable in many end-of-life decisionmaking situations.
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Italy's, the doctrine of stare decisisl82 does not exist; judicial
opinions are not formally and legally binding upon later courts
on the same or lower levels.18 3
The Cassazione thus interpreted the Italian statutes and
constitution to encompass the doctrine of informed consent,
which Americans tend to think of as a tort concept, and to
encompass it quite broadly. First, it stated that informed consent
provides the right to consent to treatment as well as the right to
refuse treatment.184 The court supported this interpretation of
informed consent by citing national' 85 and supranational8 6
182. Stare decisis is a common-law doctrine pursuant to which courts must
follow previous judicial decisions on the same issue. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1537 (Bryan A. Garner et al. eds., 9th ed. 2009). Cf jurisprudence constante (a civil
law doctrine pursuant to which a "court should give great weight to a rule of law
that is accepted and applied in a long line of cases, and should not overrule or
modify its own decisions unless clear error is shown and injustice will arise from
continuation of a particular rule of law."). Id. at 933.
183. Article 101 of the Italian Constitution states that the judges are
"subject[ed]" (i.e., must apply) "only to the "law," intended to include only
statutory law. Although prior decisions of the Italian civil, administrative, and
criminal courts cannot be considered as sources of law, they are persuasive
instruments for the interpretation of the Constitution, the statutes, the European
Community regulations and directives. Frequently lower and higher courts cite
prior decisions in order to sustain their arguments and legal rationale. Embedded in
the civil procedure law and judiciary act, the Cassazione has the duty to assure the
uniform interpretation of the statutes and the "unity" (the coherence) of the
"national" legal framework. When a Court of Appeal has decided a case by
applying the law as interpreted by the precedents of the Cassazione, the same
Cassazione may simply refuse to hear the "recourse" against the decision of the
Court of Appeal thereby letting the previous "case-law" or "interpretation" stand.
Thus, there is a curious "mix," in which judges are encouraged to cite prior
decisions of the Cassazione. However, since the Cassazione is composed of many
judges divided into many sections, the precedents and interpretations of the
Cassazione may not all be coherent. Thus, where a conflict of interpretation arises
between one section of the Cassazione and another, the question may be referred to
the "united sections," similar to the American en banc court, for resolution. See also
MERRYMAN & PEREZ-PERDOMO, supra note 146.
184. For similar reasoning on the American side of the Atlantic Ocean, see, e.g.,
Werth v. Taylor, 475 N.W.2d 426, 428 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991) ("Indeed, the whole
concept of informed consent to treatment leads to an inference of its converse -
informed refusal of treatment.").
185. The court cited an Italian legislative decree (n. 211/2003) which
implemented a European directive (D.L. 4 Aprile 2001, n. 2001/20/EC, available at
http://www.eortc.be/Services/Doc/clinical-EU-directive-04-April-01.pdf).
That decree discusses the requirements of good clinical practice in conducting
clinical trials on medical products for human use and contains a provision
specifically addressing consent given by a substitute decisionmaker for an
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incompetent patient. In addition, the court cited Italian statutes such as the law
creating the National Health Service and the code of medical ethics, adopted by the
national association representing Italian surgeons, which is an example of private,
internal self-regulation that the Italian State recognizes. See Englaro VIII, supra note
140, at 14. Additionally, the court also referred to several of its prior decisions for
the basis of informed consent, though its prior decisions cannot be considered a
source of law. See id at 9.
186. The court cited the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union
and The European Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine of 1997
("Oviedo Convention"). See Englaro VIII, supra note 140, at 9. The Convention of
Oviedo was drafted in the legal framework of the Council of Europe, an
international organization that is different from the European Union. That
Convention is an international treaty, which must be ratified by the President of the
Republic, and the ratification of which the Italian Parliament must authorize with
an ad hoc statute. See Act 28 Mar. 2001, n. 145 (also delegating legislative power to
the Executive in order to adapt the Italian legal system to the principles and the
norms of the Convention (art. 3); that legislative delegation, first extended in time
by art. 49, Act 16 Jan. 2006, n. 3 and subsequently reiterated by art. 3 of Act 27 Feb.
2007, n. 17, has never been exercised). Because the President of the Republic has
never ratified the Convention, it was not a "source of law" for the Englaro court,
although both the Cassazione in this case and the Constitutional Court in another
matter have used it as an interpretive resource (as evidence of the constitutional
heritage and tradition of the European states). See Englaro VIII, supra note 140, at 14-
15; Corte Cost. sent. 28 Jan. 2005, n. 46, n. 47, n. 48, n. 49, in which the court used the
Convention to ascertain the constitutional admissibility of a request of referendum
on the act regulating in vitro fertilization in Italy. For a comment about the process
of ratification and implementation of the Convention in Italy, see Federico Gustavo
Pizzetti, La Delega per l'Adattamento Dell'ordinamento Italiano alla Convenzione di
Oviedo tra Problemi di Fonti ed Equilibri Istituzionali: un Nuovo "Cubo di Rubik"?, 3
RASSEGNA PARLAMENTARE 585-608 (2007).
The Convention of Oviedo thus differs in origin from the Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the European Union, which is within the legal framework of the European
Union. Since the Charter was never incorporated in the previous Treaties, of the
European Union, it had no "legal force," formally speaking, even if it provided
interpretative assistance, at the time Englaro VIII was decided. The Charter was,
however, eventually incorporated into the Treaty of Lisbon, and Italy has ratified
that treaty. When all member states of the European Union ratify the treaty, the
Charter will possess the same legal force as any other treaty Italy has recognized
and will become the primary source of the European Union's law, on the same level
as the treaties. For further information regarding the complex interaction between
European Union human rights protection and the European Union member states'
constitutional law, see Paola Bilancia, Aspetti e Problemi Della Tutela Multilivello dei
Diritti, in DIGNIDAD DE LA PERSONA, DERECHOS FUNDAMENTALES, JUSTICIA
CONSTITUCIONAL Y OTROs ESTUDIOS DE DERECHO PUBLICO, 435 (Francisco F. Segado
ed., 2008); see generally DAVID J. HARRIS ET AL., LAW OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION
ON HUMAN RIGHTS (2d ed. 2009); see generally MARGOT HORSPOOL & MATTHEW
HUMPHREYS, EUROPEAN UNION LAW (5th ed. 2008); see generally PRINCIPLES OF
EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Armin von Bogdandy & Jilrgen Bast eds., 2006);
see generally KOEN LENAERTS & PIET VAN NUFFEL, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE
EUROPEAN UNION (Robert Bray ed., 2d ed. 2005); ANDREW Z. DRZEMCZEWSKI,
EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS CONVENTION IN DOMESTIC LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY
(2004); see generally KAREN J. ALTER, ESTABLISHING THE SUPREMACY OF EUROPEAN
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sources of law, as well as citing and distinguishing authoritative
sources from other jurisdictions187  in arriving at its
interpretation. Similar to the U.S. Supreme Court, the
Cassazione determined that while informed consent provided
the basis to refuse treatment, it would not provide the right to
assisted death.1 8 Likewise, the Cassazione distinguished
between refusing treatment, which allows an illness to follow its
natural progression, and assisted death, which the court viewed
as an action that hastens death. The Cassazione cited the U.S.
Supreme Court decision in Vacco v. Quill'8 9 to support its
assertion that the right to refuse medical treatment is based on
the right to bodily integrity, i.e., the right to refuse unwanted
invasive interventions, and not from a general right to die.190
Despite echoing the U.S. Supreme Court's limitations on
end-of-life decisionmaking rights, the Cassazione went farther in
intellectual basis than the U.S. Supreme Court has gone in
LAW (2001).
187. The Cassazione cited Art. 1111-10 of the French Code of Public Health,
inserted in Law No. 2005-370 of 22 April 2005, to substantiate its assertion that
informed consent applies to situations in which refusal of care would result in the
death of patients. On the other hand, the Cassazione distinguished the ECHR's
case of Pretty v. United Kingdom, stating that although Pretty had determined that
Article 2 of the Convention of the Protection of the Human Rights and of
Fundamental Freedom does not provide the right to assisted death, the case does
not stand for denying patients the right to refuse care even when that refusal would
result in the patient's death.
Not surprisingly, the Cassazione's use of so many foreign authorities in its decision
sparked discussion in Italy similar to the discussion that took place in America after
the U.S. Supreme Court cited international authority in striking down a law
prohibiting sodomy in Lawrence v. Texas. Compare Francesco Gazzoni, La Cassazione
Riscrive la Norma Sull'Eutanasia, JUDICIUM, http://judicium.it/news/ins 26_11_07/
Gazzoni nuovi saggi.html (last visited May 9, 2011) (asserting that the Cassazione
was forced to cite so many foreign decisions because of the lack of Italian law
supporting its decision) with Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 598 (2003) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (criticizing "[t]he Court's discussion of foreign views" as
"meaningless dicta. Dangerous dicta, however, since this Court should not
impose foreign moods, fads, or fashions on Americans.").
188. Compare Englaro VIII, supra note 140, at 11-12 with Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 723 (1997); Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 799 (1997)
(refusing to find a constitutional right for a terminally ill patient to receive
assistance in ending his or her life through the prescription of prescription
medications).
189. See generally id.
190. Englaro VIII, supra note 140, at 12.
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establishing a right to refuse life-sustaining treatment. Its
constitutional right of autonomy, based upon enumerated rights
to personal identity, dignity and liberty, provides a much firmer
foundation upon which to build end-of-life decisionmaking law
than does the common-law right of informed consent that the
U.S. Supreme Court has identified, even with the constitutional
basis that the Cruzan Court assumed for the American right.
STANDARDS FOR PRoxY DECISIONMAKING: SUBSTANTIVE AND
EVIDENTIARY
Having established a constitutionally grounded form of
informed consent as the basis for the right to refuse life-
sustaining treatment, the court then examined whether the right
to refuse medical treatment applied to incompetent patients.191
That incapacitated patients themselves can exercise the right to
refuse treatment through use of the doctrine of informed consent
is a legal fiction because incapacitated patients do not have the
capacity to make informed decisions contemporaneously; a
proxy decisionmaker must be involved.192 It was thus necessary
to give the incompetent patient the right, although the court
recognized that an incompetent patient cannot act on his or her
own behalf. Therefore, it granted the right to incompetent
patients but placed two restrictions on the guardian with proxy
decisionmaking authority on behalf of the incompetent patient.
First, the guardian is not actually making his or her own
191. In this way, too, the Italian court mimicked the approach of many
American courts. As long ago as Quinlan, for example, American courts considering
these issues have proceeded in this order of inquiry. See In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d
647, 664 (1976) (the court's "affirmation of Karen's independent right of choice ...
would ordinarily be based upon her competency to assert it ... [n]evertheless [the
court] concluded that Karen's right of privacy may be asserted on her behalf by her
guardian under the peculiar circumstances here present."). See also Cruzan v. Dir.,
Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279-80 (1990)(proceeding in same order).
192. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 280 (stating that "[sluch a 'right' must be exercised for
her, if at all, by some sort of surrogate."); Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 417
(1988) (asserting that it would be "definitionally impossible for a person to make an
informed decision - either to consent or to refuse - under hypothetical
circumstances" because the three factors required for informed consent are not
present when a patient is incapacitated).
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decisions; because the decision is deeply personal, the guardian
is considered to be acting (fictitiously) "with" the patient in
making the decision. Second, the guardian must not make the
medical decision for the patient but must make the decision that
the patient would have wanted made. That is, the Cassazione
required the guardian to ascertain what the wishes of the patient
would have been with regard to the treatment choice at hand, by
examining evidence from the patient's life prior to the loss of
decisionmaking capacity.193  In addition to any wishes the
patient had expressed, a guardian may take into account the
personality, lifestyle, and inclination of the patient, as well as the
basic values of the patient, which consist of the patient's ethical,
religious, cultural, and philosophical convictions.
Although the court explicitly used the term "best interest"
in its opinion, it clearly did not mean to suggest usage of an
American, purely objective, best interests standard for
decisionmaking. Rather, it established the right to refuse
medical treatment as part of the right of personal autonomy
under the Italian Constitution (Article 13), which necessarily
implies that the patient's wishes govern. The primary objective
of the best interest standard is to make the decision that is in the
best interest of the patient, rather than a decision based on the
patient's wishes. A patient exercising his or her right to personal
autonomy, however, is entitled to a decision that is the same as
he or she would have made, without regard to whether others
agree that it is in his or her best interest. Thus, identifying the
right to refuse life-sustaining treatment as a matter of autonomy
seems to preclude use of the best interest standard unless there
is no evidence upon which to base a decision of what the patient
would have wanted when competent to make decisions for him
or herself.194 At this juncture, just as earlier, the court supported
193. See Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 664 ("The only practical way to prevent
destruction of the right is to permit the guardian and family of Karen to render their
best judgment, subject to the qualifications hereinafter stated, as to whether she
would exercise it in these circumstances.").
194. An example of that sort of case might be one involving a patient who has
been incompetent to make medical decisions all through his or her life. See, e.g.,
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its interpretive reasoning with a multitude of cases decided in
foreign jurisdictions,195 including three U.S. cases: Quinlan, In re
Jobes1 96 and Cruzan. Indeed, the Cassazione explicitly adopted
the substituted judgment standard as enunciated in Quinlan,
lobes, and Cruzan.
On the issue of which evidentiary standard applies, the
Cassazione, like most other jurisdictions, adopted the clear and
convincing evidentiary standard of proof, although the language
used by the court (that the proof must be "clear, univocal 97 and
convincing"), could be interpreted to mean a standard of proof
that is higher than clear and convincing. Clear and convincing
evidence, as traditionally understood in America, does not
require uncontroverted evidence.198 Yet the court's use of the
term "univocal" could be read to indicate that the proof must be
uncontroverted to be considered clear and convincing. Indeed,
given the court's reminders that the guardian must act "with"
the patient rather than "for" the patient, it seems as if the court
would look unfavorably upon decisions made after making
credibility determinations to choose between conflicting views
of what the patient would have wanted.
Applying this standard to the facts of Englaro does not
clarify this uncertainty. In Englaro, both of the parties (Mr.
Englaro and the appointed guardian ad litem) agreed that Ms.
Englaro would have wanted to discontinue life sustaining
treatment. All of the evidence presented indicated that Ms.
Englaro would have wanted to discontinue life sustaining
treatment. In contrast, under the Schiavo facts, the Englaro court
THE RIGHT TO DIE, supra note 10, at §4.04.
195. Other cases the court cited included Bundesgerichtschof (in Germany's
highest court of appeals), 17 Mar. 2003 judgment, and Bland, in the House of Lords,
4 Feb.1993.
196. In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 444 (1987).
197. "Univocal" means "having one meaning only." A. MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1280 (1974). In that sense, it is slightly
different from "unequivocal," which means "clear, unambiguous," according to the
same dictionary. Id. at 1277. The difference may lie in whether the conclusion can
exist in the presence of conflicting evidence, as explored in the text.
198. See THE RIGHT TO DIE, supra note 10, at § 3.27[A][1]. See, e.g., Schiavo I, supra
note 105, at 179.
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might have decided the case differently. Schiavo involved
disagreements about Ms. Schiavo's wishes, and the allegation of
a financial conflict of interest was present in Schiavo but not
present in Englaro. The court in Englaro spoke of the need for the
proxy decisionmaker to act exclusively in the interest of the
patient, so it is unclear how the court would have approached
the case if there had been a conflict of interest present. In future
cases, in which family members dispute what the patient would
have wanted or one or more of the parties requesting
discontinuance of treatment has a financial conflict of interest, it
is uncertain how Englaro's evidentiary standard would be
applied.
Going beyond the facts of Schiavo, moreover, the boundaries
of the substantive standard the Cassazione announced become
even more uncertain. It is unclear whether and to what extent
the Cassazione's announced standard applies only to patients in
PVS such as Ms. Englaro and Ms. Schiavo. Therefore, it is
unclear what standard will apply to a patient incompetent due
to another medical condition, due in part to the institutional
roles of the courts in a civil law system.199
MEDICALLY SUPPLIED NUTRITION AND HYDRATION
The Cassazione was surprisingly clear on the issue of
whether medically supplied nutrition and hydration constituted
medical treatment. It simply stated that "[t]here is no doubt that
artificial hydration and [nutrition] with a nasogastric tube
constitutes a health treatment."2 00 The Cassazione cited Cruzan
and a decision of the ECHR to support its assertion that
medically supplied nutrition and hydration is a medical
procedure and should not be considered basic sustenance.2 01
199. See infra p. 348-49.
200. Englaro VIII, supra note 140, at 18.
201. The court also supported its conclusion by indicating that the international
scientific community corroborated its position that medically supplied nutrition
and hydration is medical treatment. However, the court did not provide any
citation or reference to support its assertion. Id.
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This position is contrary to Pope John Paul II's position that "the
administration of water and food, even when provided by
artificial means, always represents a natural means of preserving
life, not a medical act ... and as such [is] morally obligatory." 2 02
The firm stance taken by the Cassazione is surprising
because the issue of whether medically supplied hydration and
nutrition should be considered a form of medical treatment, or
basic sustenance, continues to be one of the most controversial
aspects of life-sustaining treatment decisionmaking. 20 3 Indeed,
the Cassazione's position is contrary to the Italian Minister of
Welfare & Health's assertion that medically supplied nutrition
and hydration is an ordinary means of care and not a medical
treatment. This issue was a major point of contention and
political controversy in Schiavo.204 Despite the court's strong
statement, the issue may be far from settled in Italy, judging
from the political response to Englaro judicial decisions.
THE POLITICAL RHETORIC
Like Schiavo, Englaro's judicial decisions caused political
backlash and prompted response from other branches of the
government. However the political response in Englaro took a
slightly different path from that in Schiavo due to differences in
the legal systems and the different stages of end-of-life
decisionmaking legal development. In Englaro, the Parliament
directly challenged the courts' decisions by filing an appeal to
the Constitutional Court asserting that the Cassazione and the
Court of Appeal's decisions violated the separation of powers
principle in that their decisions created law, rather than
interpreting it. Because there was no Parliamentary legislation
on the issue of an incompetent patient refusing life sustaining
202. Pope John Paul II, Address of John Paul II to the Participants in the
International Congress on Life-Sustaining Treatments and Vegetative State:
Scientific Advances and Ethical Dilemmas (Mar. 20, 2004) available at
http://www.vatican.va/holy-father/john-paul-ii/speeches/2004/march/documents/h
f_jp-ii-spe_20040320_congress-fiamcen.html (emphasis omitted).
203. THE RIGHT TO DIE, supra note 10, at § 6.03[G], § 1A.01[A].
204. Shepherd, supra note 127, at 300.
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treatment, the judiciary's interpretation was susceptible to
Parliamentary attack. Under the civil law system, the judiciary's
role is to interpret law while the legislature is vested with the
power to create law. However, the Constitutional Court
dismissed the Parliament's appeal because the court found that
the Cassazione and the Court of Appeal properly arrived at their
decisions through the properly means of constitutional
interpretation.
By contrast, Florida's legislature reacted to the Schiavo
decisions by passing a law (known as "Terri's Law") authorizing
the Governor of Florida to issue an executive order requiring
reinsertion of Ms. Schiavo's PEG tube, effectively overturning a
properly rendered judicial order. Because end-of-life
decisionmaking laws were more developed in Florida when the
Schiavo cases were decided than they were in Italy when Englaro
was decided, and because the U.S. operates on a common-law
rather than a civil-law system, the Florida legislature could not
attack the Schiavo judicial decisions directly. Rather it attempted
to statutorily overturn them, a response that, similar to the
Parliamentary response to Englaro, was challenged as violating
the separation of powers principle. The Florida Supreme Court
held that the law was unconstitutional because it infringed upon
the judiciary's power by effectively reversing a properly
rendered final judgment.205 Additionally, the court held that the
legislature had unconstitutionally delegated its legislative power
to the executive branch by granting the governor unrestricted
power to issue a stay of the treatment withdrawal without
defining standards to follow in deciding when and whether to
issue or end the stay.
Strikingly similar to Florida's legislative action in Schiavo, 206
Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi (acting under pressure
from the Church, public opinion, and his Minister of Health)2 07
205. Bush v. Schiavo, 885 So. 2d 321, 332 (Fla. 2004).
206. In Italy, the executive branch is not a separate branch of government, but
rather is a part of the Italian Parliament. See Italy, in ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA:
INTERNATIONAL EDITION 429, 574 (1995).
207. See Popham, Italian Coma Woman's Death Ends Berlusconi's Bid to Keep Her
[Vol. 12344
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decided to intervene in the Englaro case by adopting "a law
decree" under the Council of Ministers' executive authority.20 8
The decree is composed of only one article essentially declaring
that nutrition and hydration is basic sustenance and cannot be
withdrawn from patients in PVS pending legislative activity on
end-of-life decisionmaking.
The Council of Ministers 209 adopted the decree, but the
President of the Republic, Giorgio Napolitano, rejected it,210
refusing to sign the decree into law because he believed that it
was unconstitutional for three reasons.211 First, adopting such an
urgent and immediate measure could be considered a means of
cutting off political debate on the issue since the Parliament was
still discussing the matter.212 Second, the decree, although
Alive, supra note 151; Peter Popham, Coma Woman's Fate Left in Berlusconi's Hands;
Prime Minister Wants Law to Overrule Italy's Highest Court, THE INDEPENDENT
(London), Feb. 9, 2009, at 22 (both noting pressure from the Catholic Church). See
Owen, Death of Coma Woman a Crime, supra note 144 (stating that Berlusconi
,reportedly reacted after the Vatican Secretary of State, Cardinal Tarcisio Bertone,
implored him to stop this crime against humanity" and citing Berlusconi as saying
that he "represented the feelings of most Italians," despite polls suggesting that
Italians were evenly divided on the issue).
208. See Michael Day, Italy Faces Constitutional Crisis Over Coma Woman, THE
OBSERVER (England), Feb. 8, 2009, at 1 (quoting Berlusconi on his decision); see Art.
77 Constituzione [Cost.](It.) (law decree may be issued out of urgency and
necessity).
209. The Council of Ministers is an executive-level cabinet; the Prime Minister
suggests the Ministers, and the President appoints them. See Art. 92 Constituzione
(Cost.J(It.). The Prime Minister serves as the President of the Council of Ministers.
See MAURIZIO COTTA & LUCA VERZICHELLI, POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS IN ITALY 128
(figure 4.2) (2007). See also id. at 133 (figure 4.3) (depicting the structure of the
Council of Ministers); ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA, supra note 206, at 574 (1995)).
210. See Paddy Agnew, Italian Woman in Right-to-Die Controversy Dies, THE IRISH
TIMES, Feb. 10, 2009, at 13 (noting Napolitano's rejection of the decree); Maria De
Cristofaro & Sebastian Rotella, Comatose Italian Woman Dies; Political Furor
Continues, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2009, at A3 (same). As in the U.S., the President of
the Republic may sign the decree into law or veto it. Unlike the structure of
American government, however, the President of the Republic is a member of
neither the legislative branch nor the executive branch. See THOMAS GLYN WATKIN,
THE ITALIAN LEGAL TRADITION 62 (1997) ("The president is not a member of the
executive and in effect stands above the other organs of government as a neutral
constitutional guardian.").
211. See Letter from the President of the Republic to the President of the Council
of Ministers (Feb. 6, 2009), available at http://www.quirinale.it/elementi/Continua.
aspx?tipo= 4&key=8112 (sent prior to the Council's passage of the decree).
212. Id.
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written in general and abstract terms, could be considered
"exceptionally urgent" and "necessary" only if applied to
Eluana Englaro herself.213 Since the courts had definitively
settled Englaro, the decree violated the separation of powers
principle because it effectively nullified an act of the judiciary
that recognized a fundamental, constitutional right of a citizen.214
Third, since the Cassazione had found that the right to refuse
life-sustaining treatment was a fundamental right guaranteed by
the Constitution, a legislative decree could not be enacted to
deprive the individual of that right.215
Although this act was a product of the executive branch in
Italy, its substance and effect closely resembled that of "Terri's
Law" in the Schiavo case. Like Schiavo, this conflict created an
unprecedented constitutional and institutional crisis and caused
a media furor.216  In the end, the constitutional crisis was
avoided when Prime Minister Berlusconi and his Government
changed the decree into a bill 2 17 and presented the bill to the
Senate, requesting that the Parliament approve it "ad horas."218
213. Id.
214. Id. See also Woman Dies as Bill Passed to Keep Her Alive, THE NEW ZEALAND
HERALD, Feb. 10, 2009 (citing Italian constitutional law professor as supporting the
conclusion that the bill was unconstitutional for this reason).
215. See Letter from the President, supra note 211; see also NEW ZEALAND
HERALD, supra note 214.
216. The political posture taken by the Prime Minister and the President
mirrored Italy's division on this issue, and both sides had their supporters. See
Cristofaro & Rotella, supra note 210, at A3 (giving a sense of the deep divisions in
Italy over the issue); Day, supra note 208, at 1 (same); Day & McVeigh, supra note 3,
at 8 (describing Englaro as having exposed "faultlines that run through Italian
society, with politicians, campaigners and the church battling for the country's
soul."). Prime Minister Berlusconi used the controversy to suggest that his political
party and government were the only ones that tried to save an innocent life.
Berlusconi also insinuated that the behavior of the President of the Republic was
"pro-euthanasia" (which is a crime in Italy).
217. See Paddy Agnew, supra note 210, at 13. This move effectively changed the
decree, which would have immediate legal force, into a legislative initiative
requiring Parliamentary approval before having legal effect.
218. "Ad horas" means "within hours" in Latin. Prime Minister Berlusconi and
his government specified a time period of three days in this instance. See Popham,
Coma Woman's Fate Left in Berlusconi's Hands, supra note 207, at 22 (describing
Berlusconi's "intention of ramming a regular law thorough both houses of
parliament within three days"). Observers in Italy believed that a three-day time
limit was significant as biblical reference, speculating that the political right-wing
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Ms. Englaro passed away while the Senate was discussing the
bill. Pressure from the left-wing opposition then moved the
right-wing majority, headed by Berlusconi, to abandon that bill
and shifted the discussion to a more general bill on advance
directives. 219
As discussed previously, Englaro also had prompted the
executive branch of the Lombardy Region 220 to take action
contrary to the judicial determinations. Ultimately, an
administrative court ruled that the General Health Director
could not do so. This is a contrast to the way Florida's executive
branch responded to the Schiavo controversy. Because the laws
establishing an individual's right to withdrawal of artificial
nutrition and hydration, generally speaking, were clear in
Florida, the executive branch could not openly defy the judiciary
without causing a constitutional crisis. Instead, in Florida, the
Department of Children and Family (DCF) sought permission
from the court to intervene in the Schiavo case based on a report
outlining neglect and abuse in the care of Ms. Schiavo.221 The
executive branch came close to defying the judiciary when the
Governor requested Florida Department of Law Enforcement
agents "stand ready to seize Terri Schiavo should a 'legal widow
of opportunity come."' 2 22 Ultimately, the executive branch did
majority meant to draw a parallel between Ms. Englaro's "promised resurrection"
in three days to the number of days the Bible says that Jesus Christ spent in his
tomb before resurrection. Despite medical experts' statements to the contrary, see
Day, supra note 208, at 1, many believed at the time that Ms. Englaro could survive
only three days without life-sustaining treatment.
219. See Federico Gustavo Pizzetti, In margine agli ultimi sviluppi del "caso
Englaro": limiti della legge e "progetto di vita," POLITICA DEL DIRITTO (Mar. 5, 2009).
220. Italy is organized similarly to the United States in that its 20 regions
operate with some autonomy. The Italian Constitution enumerates powers
reserved to the State and those shared between the State and the regions. Those
powers not enumerated are left to the regions. Art. 117 Constituzione [Cost.](It.)
Five of the regions enjoy varying degrees of autonomy. Art. 116 Constituzione
[Cost.](It.) See also COTTA & VERZICHELLI, supra note 209, at 191-93.
221. William R. Levesque & Wes Allison, Source of Claims in Schiavo Case was
Abuse Hotline, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Mar. 4, 2005, at lB. The judge allowed the
investigation to proceed and the DCF ultimately concluded that there were no
indications that Ms. Schiavo had been abused or neglected. See Chris Tisch &
Curtis Krueger, Schiavo Abuse Claims Were Old, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, June 4, 2005,
at 1A.
222. See Dara Kam, Agents Readied in Case 'Legal Window' Opened, PALM BEACH
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not openly defy the judiciary in America, in contrast to what
happened in Italy, a testament perhaps to the different stages in
end-of-life decisionmaking law of the two counties.2 23
INSTITUTIONAL DIFFERENCES: COMMON LAW VERSUS CIVIL LAW
Although the Cassazione's decision established that
incompetent persons have the right to refuse life-prolonging
treatment, it leaves future end-of-life decisionmaking cases
uncertain for a variety of reasons. First, Italy is a civil law
country. Under the civil law system, court decisions do not have
binding authority on lower courts. 224 Thus, in direct contrast to
the common-law, precedent-driven system in effect in America,
even a decision of the nation's highest court is not binding and
serves only as persuasive authority. More important, Ms.
Englaro's case was not decided by the court in plenary session,
but rather by the First Civil Section of the Court. 225 The fact that
the case was not heard in plenary session means that the opinion
would not be as persuasive when considered as part of the law
in effect in later cases as if it had been decided in plenary
POST, Mar. 26, 2005, at 8.
223. The Governor's spokeswoman went on the record denying rumors that the
Governor would act without judicial approval and she indicated that the
Governor's office was working through the legal process. Id.
224. See MAURO CAPPELLETTI ET AL., THE ITALIAN LEGAL SYSTEM: AN
INTRODUCTION 270 (1967) ("judicial decisions are not binding precedents in
subsequent cases"); however, the authors also noted that a "prior decision is, in
realistic if not in formal terms, a precedent." Id. at 272. See also Vincenzo Varano,
Machinery of Justice, in INTRODUCTION TO ITALIAN LAW 99, 111 (Jeffrey S. Lena &
Ugo Mattei eds., 2002) ("decisions, even if issued by the plenary session of the
Supreme Court [of Cassazaione], do not bind lower courts, as would be the case in a
common law jurisdiction, although they do enjoy a strong persuasive authority").
For a discussion on the wider role of precedents in the civil law system, see Mauro
Cappelletti, The Doctrine of Stare Decisis and the Civil Law: A Fundamental Diference -
or no Difference at All?, in Festschrift ffir Konrad Zweigert: ZUM 70. GEBURTSTAG 381
(Herbert Bernstein et al. eds. 1981).
225. The Supreme Court of Cassation is divided into three civil and six criminal
divisions, with five members per section. In cases of importance or cases that
involve conflict of decisions decided by different sections of the court, the decision
is given by a "plenary session (sezioni unite)" composed of a panel of nine judges
selected from all sections of the Court. Until an issue has been decided by a plenary
session, there is the possibility of conflicting Court of Cassation precedents.
Vincenzo Varano, supra note 224, at 108.
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session. Consequently, future cases with similar facts could be
decided differently than Ms. Englaro's case.226
That the Constitutional Court did not find a separation of
powers violation in the Cassazione's decision might indicate that
the Constitutional Court tacitly agreed with the substance of the
decision. However, that inference could be proven false because
the Constitutional Court has not stated that the Cassazione's
interpretation is the only interpretation possible.
LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENT OF ADVANCE DIRECTIVES
Similar to Quinlan, which prompted legislative activities in
various American states, the Cassazione's decision has also
given weight to debate regarding advance directives in Italy.2 27
Efforts in the Italian Parliament to pass a statute specifically
authorizing advance directives began long before228 the
Cassazione's decision in Englaro,229 and they continued during
226. After Englaro, a section of the Cassazione specializing in tort law
confirmed that a person anticipatorily may refuse any life-sustaining treatment, but
required specific, informed, written instructions to that effect. See the Court of
Cassazione, sect. III, sent. 15 Sept. 2008, n. 23676 (specializing in tort law).
227. See also Donald Carroll & Christine Marciasini, Advance Care Directives:
Florida, Italy and the Holy Grail of Wishes, E-REPORT (ABA SECTION OF REAL
PROPERTY, TRUST & ESTATE LAW) Oct. 2008, at 4, available at http://www.abanet.org
/rpte/publications/ereport/2008/5/TE_- CarrollMarciasiniAdvance.pdf (noting that
legislation authorizing advance directives would assist in cases such as Englaro
because it would "allow an individual to express his or her health care wishes
clearly"). After Ms. Englaro died, "some Italians began using YouTube to post their
own living wills" in an attempt to circumvent their country's lack of advance
directive legislation. See Donadio, supra note 144, at A7.
228. See generally FEDERICO GUSTAVO PIZZETTI, ALLE FRONTIERE DELLA VITA: IL
TESTAMENTO BIOLOGICO TRA VALORI COSTITUZIONALI E PROMOZIONE DELLA
PERSONA (Giuffr6 2008).
229. In 2003, Italy's National Committee for Bioethics (the Committee)
produced a document providing the Legislature with a unanimous, balanced view
of advance directives to use in lawmaking. In 2006, the Committee produced a
second document, this one approved by only a majority over strong opposition,
about the refusal of medically supplied nutrition and hydration. See generally
Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri, Comitato Nazionale Per La Bioetica,
L'Alimentazione e L'Idratazione di Pazienti in Stato Vegetativo Persistente, GOVERNO
ITALIANO (Sept. 30, 2005), http://www.governo.it/bioetica/testi/PEG.pdf. The
Tribunal of Lecco cited the 2006 document as supporting the view that the
administration of medically supplied nutrition and hydration is ordinary care, not
capable of being refused unless it cannot be metabolized and death is imminent.
See also Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri, Comitato Nazionale Per La Bioetica,
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those case proceedings. Shortly after the Cassazione's judgment,
unforeseen elections in early spring 2008 interrupted the
legislative process. Efforts restarted with a differently-
constituted Parliament, with a different political majority, but
slowed once again when both Houses of the Italian Parliament
became involved in the Englaro litigation.230 The process,
however, picked up a great deal of speed in the Italian Senate
after Ms. Englaro's death, with strong conflicts emerging
between opposing political parties.231 The overall framework of
the proposed legislation in the Italian Parliament divides neatly
into distinct sub-sections for purposes of analysis. It specifically
governs both informed consent and what Americans would call
advance directives, to be called "anticipated declarations of
treatment" (ADT) in Italy. 23 2 The major substantive portions of
Rifiuto e Rinuncia Conssapevole al Trattamento Sanitario nella Relazione Paziente-Medico,
GOVERNO ITALIANO http://www.governo.it/bioetica/testi/Rifiuto-postille 911
088.pdf. For a discussion of the 2006 Committee document, see Gilda Ferrando,
Nutrizione e Idratazione dei Pazienti in SVP: a Proposito del Parere del CNB del 30
settembre 2005, 13 BIOETICA 85 (2005). More recently, in June 2009, the Italian
Medical Association adopted a document, available at http://portale.fnomceo.it
/PortaleFnomceo/showltem.2puntOT?id=66102, stating that the provision of
medically supplied nutrition and hydration is a medical practice that the patient
may refuse as an exercise of his or her liberty right.
230. See infra p. 320-28 (describing the recourse for conflict of attribution).
231. The text that first the Hygiene and Health Senate Commission, and
subsequently the entire Senate debated during the early spring of 2009 (quite
quickly because of the strong will of the political majority to adopt the new
legislation as soon as possible), was an amalgam of the different proposals
previously presented by various senators, elaborated and drafted by senator
Calabr6 (n. A.S. 10). The Senate approved that text, with some amendments, on
March 26, 2009 (with 150 yays, 123 nays and 3 absentees). Shortly thereafter, the bill
went to the other Parliamentary body, the House of Deputies, where it is pending
(n. A.C. 2350). In the Italian constitutional system, the President of the Republic
may sign a bill into law only if both the Senate and the House of Deputies have
approved the same text. See Arts. 70-73 Constituzione [Cost.] (It.).
232. Members of the Italian Parliament wished to avoid using the term
"directive" because they did not wish to accord these documents with rigidly
binding force, and similarly wished to avoid use of the term "living will" to avoid
the strictly binding nature of testamentary written wills. While patients' wishes
with regard to end-of-life care should be binding, it is true that strict application is
not always possible because patients cannot predict their exact medical conditions
or precisely what medical treatment they might need near the ends of their lives.
See THE RIGHT TO DIE, supra note 10, at §7.02[B] (discussing advance
decisionmaking). Cf Kathy L. Cerminara, An Analysis of H.701, UNIV. OF MIAMI
ETHICS PROGRAM, 4 (Feb. 25, 2005), http://www6.miami.edu/ethics/schiavo/
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the proposed legislation are Article 2, governing informed
consent, and Articles 3, 4, and 6 through 8, which introduce
ADTs into the legal system.
The Foundational Provisions of Italy's Proposed Legislation
Like many legislatures in America, 233 the Italian Parliament
began by setting forth some overarching principles in the
context of which those working with the law could construe its
primary provisions. For example, the Italian Parliament noted
that the recognition and protection of human life, which it
expressly states is an "inviolable and inalienable right," must be
guaranteed to terminally ill patients, even those who are
incompetent, until they die. It also emphasized, however,
recognizing the dignity of each person, over and above the
interests of society, technology, or science. It reiterated the
Italian criminal code's prohibition of euthanasia and assisted
suicide, noting that medicine must be devoted to the protection
of life and health and the relief of suffering.234 The Parliament
also recognized the "priority" of the therapeutic relationship
existing between physicians and patients, particularly important
near the end of life, and it highlighted the importance of the
informed consent principle. Finally, and importantly, it stated
that when a patient is at the end of life, or in a "condition of
death foreseen as imminent," physicians have a duty to abstain
from treatments that are "extraordinary," "not proportionate,"
"not efficient," or inadequate to treat the terminal condition.
In Article 2 of the proposed legislation, the Parliament
traced the provisions of Article 5 of the Oviedo Convention
pdfjfiles/030805- HB701-LegalAnalysis.pdf.
233. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.102 (2010) (legislative findings and intent).
234. The provisions of the criminal code to which this section referred generally
relate to homicide of a person consenting to be killed and instigation or assistance
of suicide; they do not relate specifically to any of these crimes occurring in a
medical context. Therefore, one could argue that the legislature has written new
prohibitions into this legislation by interpreting previously existing general
criminal codes to apply to a specific situation. Doing so arguably would contravene
the Italian Constitution's requirement that criminal provisions be specific.
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addressing informed consent.235 Unless a patient is incompetent
and his or her life is in peril, the physician must accurately
inform 23 6 that patient of diagnosis, prognosis, the nature of the
treatment proposed, treatment objectives, probable risks and
benefits, foreseeable side effects, practicable alternatives, and the
consequences of refusal of treatment. The law requires that a
written document memorializing the consent be entered into the
patient's medical record. Patients retain the right to revoke
consent, in full or in part, at any time.
If a patient is incompetent and his or her life is not in peril,
physicians must obtain consent from someone speaking on
behalf of the patient. This could be a health care proxy
(someone appointed through an ADT) or a court-appointed
guardian. If the patient is a minor, his or her parents are
responsible for consenting, and they are to pay attention to their
child's wishes when doing so. In general, in fact, the
responsibility of those consenting on behalf of incompetent
patients is to keep both the patients' physical and psychological
health in mind.
Italy's Proposed ADTs
Most importantly, the proposed legislation authorizes
ADTs, through which those who are fully capable and
informed 237 may express their wishes regarding future
treatment. The ADT must be written, dated and signed by both
the patient and the patient's attending physician. 23 8 It Will
235. As noted previously, see supra note 186, Parliament had previously ratified
the Convention of Oviedo, an international treaty, but the convention has no legal
force in Italy standing independently because that country's president had never
ratified it. See Pizzetti, supra note 186. This proposed legislation essentially would
give legal force to that portion of the treaty.
236. The patient may refuse the information.
237. One wonders the extent to which patients acting anticipatorily can be
informed. To some extent, it is difficult to predict what will occur near the end of a
patient's life. This is why requiring a high degree of information before making an
advance directive, or requiring a high degree of specificity in an advance directive
will reduce the effectiveness of such directives. See Cerminara, Tracking the Storm,
supra note 91, at 173 n.124; see also Cerminara, An Analysis of H.701, supra note 232.
238. Proposta di Legge 26 marzo 2009, n. 2350 (It). Art. 4, sect. 1, 2.
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remain valid for five years unless revoked or modified before
the expiration of that time period. It also may be renewed as
many times as the declarant likes.239
One form of ADT resembles a living will. Using an ADT, a
declarant may request treatment, or may refuse treatment that is
"not proportionate" 240 and would not be required by the law or
medical ethics.241 The declarant may not request assistance in
dying or euthanasia.242 Importantly, the declarant also may not
refuse medically supplied nutrition and hydration, for the
Parliament has deemed those to be forms of vital sustenance
physiologically tied to pain relief at the end of life.243 ADTs
become effective when a medical panel 24 has determined that
the patient cannot make a medical decision because of
incompetency through a vegetative state.245
Another form of ADT resembles the various sorts of
instruments pursuant to which patients in the United States
appoint surrogate decisionmakers. Using an ADT, a declarant
may appoint a "fiduciary," who must be a competent adult who
also signs the appointment.246 This person, who becomes the
only one authorized to discuss the patient's condition with his or
her doctors, is statutorily required to act in the "exclusive and
best interest" of the patient, following only the wishes the
239. Art. 4, sect. 3, 4.
240. Art. 3, sect. 3.
241. Art 3, sect. 2.
242. Art. 3, sect. 4.
243. Art. 3, sect. 5.
244. The medical panel would be comprised of a coroner, an anesthetist and a
neurologist, with participation from the attending physician and a specialist in the
area medicine relevant to the patient's condition.
245. Art. 3, sect. 6. The Parliament did not require that a patient be in a
persistent or permanent vegetative state, perhaps because of advice to that effect from
an ad hoc work group appointed by the Minister of Labour, Health & Social Policies
(Welfare) (at the time only Minister of Health). See http://www.ministerosalute.it
/imgs/C_17_primopianoNuovo_201_documentiitemDocumenti_0_fileDocumento.
pdf (Nov. 17, 2008) (strongly recommending abandonment of those terms).
Another work group, appointed five years previously by a different Minister of
Health, had advised to the contrary. See Zadig (reprinting from Bioetica n. 2/2001)
(on file with author).
246. Art. 6.
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incompetent expressed in the ADT. The fiduciary must guard
against homicide or assisted suicide occurring.
One major struggle in the Senate concerned whether ADTs
would be mandatory, in two vastly different ways. The Senate
considered the following options:
(a) Patients would be required to complete ADTs, which
would then be binding on their attending physicians;
(b) Patients would not be required to complete ADTs, but if
completed they would be binding on their attending
physicians; or
(c) Patients would not be required to complete ADTs, and
physicians could consider them to be advisory, but not
binding, on their actions.
The result in Italy's proposed legislation was the third
option. Article 7 of the proposed legislation makes clear that
citizens need not execute ADTs if they choose not to do so.
Moreover, it specifies that they do not bind attending
physicians; instead they are to be "taken into account" by the
physicians. In fact, a physician considering whether to follow an
ADT must memorialize in the patient's medical record the
reason why he or she either chose or chose not to follow the
ADT.24 7 In making this decision, the physician must evaluate the
patient's ADT and the views of any fiduciary the patient named,
his or her scientific views, his or her conscience, the principle of
the "inviolability of human life," the importance of the
"preservation of health," and the principles of "precaution, "
"proportionality," and "prudence." 24 8 In any event, whatever a
physician chooses to do, he or she cannot comply with
instructions to affirmatively cause the patient's death or
instructions that would otherwise be contrary to the law or
medical ethics.2 49
247. Art. 7, sect. 1.
248. Art. 7, sect. 2.
249. Id.
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Englaro and Italy's Proposed Legislation
While a step toward respecting patient autonomy in the
sense that it would permit incompetent patients to memorialize
their wishes with respect to health care decisions, Italy's
proposed legislation directly contradicts many of the major
principles underlying the Englaro decisions. Certainly the
Cassazione ruled, contrary to this proposed legislation, that
medically supplied nutrition and hydration is a medical
treatment capable of refusal on the same basis as any other
treatment, whereas the proposed legislation would prohibit
withholding or withdrawal of it. Even more broadly, and more
striking, however, is the proposed legislation's narrowing of the
robust constitutional principles of bodily integrity and
autonomy apparent in the court's decision.
The Cassazione found broad, inviolate, fundamental rights
of human dignity and personal identity that reach much further
than the proposed legislation would. Absent from this proposed
legislation is any recognition that human dignity and personal
identity is a deeply personal matter, to be determined by each
individual for him or herself, no matter what the interests of
society and science are. The fiduciary is to act in the patient's
best interests, following only the wishes the patient had
expressed in his or her ADT, whereas the court in Englaro
recognized that a variety of information about the patient would
be relevant to the determination of what he or she would have
wanted in terms of treatment, which it held to be the important
goal of end-of-life decisionmaking. Similarly, the patient is not
permitted to bind anyone later with his or her wishes.
Regardless of what a patient or that patient's fiduciary says, the
physician may decide not to follow the ADT with no
consequence, as long as he or she memorializes the reason for
doing so.
The end result is a complex body of norms governing
physicians' interpretations and applications of (or decisions not
to apply) ADTs, with additional reminders that euthanasia is
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prohibited and the right to life in inalienable. That euthanasia is
prohibited is generally accepted, not only in Italy but also in
most countries. 25 0 That the right to life is unalienable is
incontestable, at least if this adjective is interpreted in the sense
that life cannot be sold. What is left as groundbreaking in this
proposed legislation is a set of rules that gives incompetent
patients the ability to express their wishes but robs that
expression of actual effect.
Of course, end-of-life decisionmaking is always a balancing
act between the interest in preserving life and health and patient
autonomy. If a patient has a reasonable hope of recovery, what
the Italian Parliament has declared to be a right to life likely
should prevail, especially when the incompetent patient has left
no indication that he or she might wish otherwise. Yet
autonomy, as an expression of human dignity and personal
identity, is sufficiently important that advance directives should
always bind decisionmakers for incompetent patients to act in
accordance with the patient's values, goals, and desires. In any
particular case, the precise details of exactly which treatments
should be withheld or withdrawn, and the precise time at which
to do so, must be left to a presently, currently competent,
decisionmaker, who must make such decisions in accordance
with the patient's overall values, goals and desires.
In the proposed legislation, the Parliament seems to have
been so focused on protecting the right to life and the principle
of preservation of health that it greatly diminished the principle
of patient self-determination. The overall structure of this
proposed legislation, including the general principles the
Parliament was so careful to delineate, is intended to apply in
every case, despite each patient's unique situation. For example,
two important goals of medicine are to preserve health and
alleviate suffering, as the proposed legislation states. However,
relying solely on the fact that those are important goals casts
aside the importance of the patient's subjective evaluation of his
250. The Netherlands and Switzerland are two notable exceptions. See THE
RIGHT TO DIE, supra note 10, at § 12.
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or her own "health" and "suffering." The Court of Cassation
recognized that prolonging a patient's life in a terminal
condition or a persistent vegetative state could be unbearable at
different stages for various patients. It was willing to give those
patients the right to refuse treatment, whereas the Parliament
would give physicians the right to override any desire a patient
had to refuse treatment depending on the physicians' beliefs that
treatment was required to serve the goals of medicine the
Parliament had listed.
Moreover, the statute is curiously limiting in its terms. It
expressly contemplates only consent for treatment or refusal of
treatment in section 2; in the sections on ADTs, those
instruments similarly are designed to provide guidance on
"activation" or "non-activation" of treatment. Nowhere is
provision expressly made for authorization of the withdrawal of
treatment to which the patient previously had consented. The
result, if narrowly interpreted, without consideration of section
2, could be that a treatment once started can never be
withdrawn, which could in turn discourage trying continuing
treatments that might not work, for fear that they can never later
be withdrawn.
Even more important, while advance directives in America
are primarily used to express views regarding life-sustaining
treatment, the withholding or withdrawal of which would result
in the patient's death, various portions of the proposed
legislation in Italy seem to prohibit ADTs from being used for
that purpose in that country. Article 2, section 9 emphasizes that
physicians may proceed without informed consent when an
incompetent patient is in an emergency condition. Potentially
building upon that, the wording of Article 4, section 6 specifies
that an ADT does not apply when the patient is in an emergency
condition or when the patient's life is in imminent danger.251
251. The combined interpretation of Article 2, Section 9 and Article 4, section 6
could result in great ambiguity in certain circumstances. Article 4, section 6 is
rather unremarkable if it simply reinforces Article 2, Section 9 by specifying that
treatment should be administered if there is an emergency situation and the
physician or the fiduciary is unable to find the patient's ADT. It similarly is
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Article 1, section 1(c) refers to medicine as being exclusively
devoted to the defense of life. And Article 7, section 2 advises
physicians that they are to follow the principle of inviolability of
life when interpreting a patient's ADT. The Cassazione
expressly held in Englaro that both competent and incompetent
patients possessed a right to refuse medical treatment, rooted in
the constitutional principles of human dignity and identity,
encompassing decisions to withhold even life-sustaining
treatment. The Parliament has not clearly stated this, which
could result in controversy when an incompetent patient has
expressed a wish to do so in his or her ADT and the attending
physician is attempting to decide whether to follow the patient's
wish.
On another, different, point, the Parliament has chosen a
curiously limiting triggering condition as the point at which
patients' ADTs would become effective. The proposed
legislation provides that the ADT will become "relevant" only
when the unconscious patient is in a vegetative state. Strictly
interpreting the proposed legislation would prohibit
consideration of a patient's wishes as expressed in an ADT when
the patient is incompetent for some other reason. For example, if
a patient is in the late stages of Alzheimer's disease but is not in
a vegetative state, his or her ADT would have no effect under a
strict interpretation of the proposed legislation. In reality,
considering this limited triggering condition and the fact that
patients may not refuse medically supplied nutrition and
hydration, the proposed legislation has a very narrow range of
application indeed.
somewhat (although less) straightforward in application if it means that treatment
should be administered if there is an emergency situation and the physician or
fiduciary must act before there is time to read and understand an ADT. The
combination of Article 2, Section 9 and Article 4, section 6, however, has the
potential to eviscerate the rest of the legislation if it is read to imply that treatment
is to be administered in any emergency condition, even when an ADT is fully
known and applicable, or, worse yet, even if the emergency condition arose because
of application of the ADT (as, for example, when a ventilator is removed and the
patient begins to die from lack of oxygen). The latter interpretation would be
inconsistent with the very existence of the statute.
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AN ALTERNATIVE TO ADVANCE DIRECTIVES IN ITALY?
It would be a mistake, in any event, to believe that the
failure of this proposed bill to pass Parliament means that
individuals are powerless to execute legal instruments to plan
for medical treatment decisions when they are unable to give
informed consent. Even leaving aside the constitutional
provisions at issue in Englaro, Italian law currently presents a
framework within which patients who wish to memorialize
instructions for future care may do so. In 2006, Italian law was
amended to provide for the appointment of an "amministratore di
sostegno" for an incompetent patient. Similar to a guardian, this
person could conceivably act as a health care proxy if a patient
so chose, upon that patient's incompetency.
Three peculiarities of the law governing such
amministratores seem to make the authorization of such persons
to act on behalf of patients equivalent to patients' abilities to
execute advance directives. First, the process by which an
amministratore is chosen can resemble a health care proxy
designation; even if the court overseeing the patient's
guardianship proceeding appoints the amministratore, the
patient/ward is entitled to have designated his or her
amministratore in advance. 252 Second, when the guardianship
court establishes the amministratore's powers, it considers the
specific needs and conditions of the patient/ward, incorporating
a great deal of flexibility in accordance with particular
conditions and the patient/ward's previously manifested
wishes.253 Finally, the patient/ward may leave the amministratore
a set of directives authenticated by a notary, thus in effect
leaving a living will for the amministratore to follow.
Using the appointment of an amministratore to serve the
same goals as an advance directive would serve could be
252. See Federico G. Pizzetti, II Disegno di Legge Governativo sui "DICO" e il
Testamento Biologico: Spunti di Riflessione, in INIZIO E FINE VITA: SOGGETTI, DIRITTI,
CONFLITTI 56 (Federico G. Pizzetti & Marzia Rosti eds., Giuffr6 2007).
253. See generally EMANUELE CALo, AMMINISTRAZIONE DI SOSTEGNO: LEGGE 9
GENNAIO 2004, N. 6 (Giuffr& 2004).
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controversial. Amministratores are supposed to be appointed
when a patient/ward is not fully deprived of competence but
instead when he or she suffers some physical or mental illness
that impairs the ability to live in full autonomy. 254 Extension of
the concept into the situation in which a patient is permanently
unconscious, as Ms. Englaro was, might be questioned.
Similarly, it is unclear whether amministratores' powers may
include health care decisionmaking powers, especially end-of-
life health care decisionmaking powers. 255
Recent cases, however, have indicated that this is possible.
Many cases before the Guardianship Court in Modena 256 have
opened the door to the use of this tool with respect to health care
decisions, even in order to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining
and life-saving devices. Doing so would compensate for the lack
of specific legislation about advance directives in Italy and in
fact might prove to be more expansive than the proposed
legislation pending before Parliament at this time. If this trend
in the law continues, and the proposed legislation does not take
effect, future patients may attempt to vest their amministratores di
sostegno with the powers of a health care proxy in an attempt to
provide instructions for end-of-life care in a period of future
incapacity.
254. According to Corte Cost., sent. 9 December 2005, n. 440, acting pursuant to
the amministrazione di sostegno proceeding differs from a guardianship. The first
legal device is not a substitute for the second. Thus, it is possible that a judge does
not have the power to appoint an amministratore instead of a guardian or a proxy
when the patient is completely lacking capacity - as in the vegetative state, for
example.
255. See Michele Sesta, Quali Strumenti per Attuare le Direttive Anticipate?, in
TESTAMENTO BIOLOGIcO. RIFLESSIONI DI DIECI GIURISTI 163 (Umberto Veronesi
Foundation 2006), available at http://www.fondazioneveronesi.it/allegati/Integrale
TestBIO.pdf; see also Giovanni Bonilini, Testamento di Vita ed Amministrazione di
Sostegno, in TESTAMENTO BIOLOGICO. RIFLESSIONI DI DIECI GIURISTI 189 (Umberto
Veronesi Foundation 2006).
256. Cfr. Tribunal of Modena, decree., 5 Nov. 2008 e Tribunal of Modena,
decree, 13 May 2008, e, in parte, anche Tribunal of Siena, decree, 18 June 2007 e
Tribunal of Roma, decree, 20 Dec. 2005.
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CONCLUSION
The Cassazione's decision is Italy's first substantial step toward
establishing a body of end-of-life decisionmaking case law. In
many ways, the Cassazione's decision mirrors Quinlan; it is the
first major decision in Italy to declare that an incompetent
patient can have life-sustaining treatment withdrawn or
withheld. Quinlan prompted U.S. state legislatures to enact
advance directive statues, 257 and indeed, there is Parliamentary
activity in Italy to that effect.
The Cassazione's decision is significant in its breadth. By
locating the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment within the
combined meaning of specific constitutional provisions
guaranteeing human dignity, integrity, and liberty, the Italian
court has established a firmer basis for refusal of treatment in
that country than U.S. Supreme Court decisions currently
support in America. In the United States, the Supreme Court
has been parsimonious, holding that, even with a constitutional
basis, the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment has its roots in
tort-law principles preventing unwanted touching. The Italian
conception of the right potentially encompasses a more
expansive list of intimate medical decisions, although the
Cassazione took pains to draw the line before permitting
assistance to terminally ill people in ending their lives.
There remain, however, many issues in end-of-life
decisionmaking law that have not yet been resolved in Italy.
Although the court in Englaro appeared to announce a clear and
convincing evidentiary standard, the boundary of that standard
has yet to be tested. Englaro's facts exceeded that standard
because all evidence pointed to the conclusion that Ms. Englaro
257. The intermediate appellate court decision in Quinlan appeared in 1975. See
In re Quinlan, 348 A.2d 801 (N.J. Super. Ct., Ch. Div. 1975), rev'd, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J.
1976). California passed the first advance directive statute in the United States the
following year, 1976. See THE RIGHT TO DIE, supra note 10, at § 7.01[A] at 7-7. See
also Norman Cantor, Twenty-Five Years After Quinlan: A Review of the Jurisprudence
of Death and Dying, 29 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 182, 182 (2001) ("Starting in 1976, with the
Quinlan case in New Jersey, courts and legislatures have outlined the legal bounds
governing medical conduct vis-a-vis the dying process.") (emphasis added).
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would have wished to discontinue life-sustaining treatment.
The Italian courts have yet to face a situation like Schiavo, in
which private parties bring a dispute to court.
More important, the Italian Parliament appears to be likely
to differ from the court in major ways. It disagrees with the
court on the politically controversial issue of whether medically
supplied hydration and nutrition is medical treatment that a
patient may refuse. It would pass a statute that reflects a much
more cramped version of patient autonomy than the court's
vision of that constitutional right. In a number of ways, while
Italy, in Englaro, has somewhat mimicked the United States in
judicial development of end-of-life decisionmaking law,
institutional differences seem to be leading it down a different
path in the Parliament.
Interestingly, it seems as if Italy's path toward patients
preserving robust end-of-life decisionmaking power even in
incompetency lies not through the Parliament in the future but
through past actions of the Parliament. If the current proposed
legislation fails, it is possible that patients and the courts can
build upon the groundwork already established through the
Italian constitution and the statutory tool of the amministratore di
sostegno to secure robust patient autonomy near the end of life.
The road may not end so far from that of the United States after
all, but only after taking some twists and turns.
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